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ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN' 
Tyler T. Ochoa·· 
Abstract 
This article surveys the history and development of the public 
domain in intellectual property law. The public domain has existed 
since time immemorial, and was first recognized in the Statute of 
Monopolies and the Statute of Anne, which placed time limits on 
patents and copyrights, after which the invention or work could be 
copied freely by anyone. The concept was enshrined in the u.s. 
Constitution and reflected in American patent and copyright laws. 
Before 1896, courts referred to matter not protected by patent or 
copyright law as "public property" or "common property." In 1896, 
the u.s. Supreme Court imported the term "public domain" from 
French law, and it was popularized by Learned Hand in the first 
decades of the 20th Century. Since 1960, the u.s. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the Constitutional dimensions of the public 
domain. Those dimensions include two important principles that have 
been obscured in recent years: public ownership of matter in the 
public domain and the irrevocable nature of the public domain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public domain is something that we enjoy every day without 
thinking about it. We take it for granted that the plays of Shakespeare and 
the symphonies of Beethoven are in the public domain and may be freely 
copied, adapted, and performed by anyone. Our theaters are filled with 
movies and musicals based on public domain works. We daily use 
technology derived from earlier inventions, such as the car, the airplane, the 
telephone, and the computer. We understand intuitively that any scientist 
may rely on Newton's laws of motion or Einstein's theory of relativity as he 
or she sees fit. We use common words that once were brand names such 
as, aspirin, cellophane, thermos, and escalator. Students and scholars debate 
historical events, ranging from the origins of man to the impeachment of 
President Clinton. 
Copyright © 2002 Tyler T. Ochoa . 
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Yet for all of its importance in our daily lives, only in recent decades has 
the public domain become the object of serious scholarly study. I Following 
David Lange's clarion call for more research in 1 9 8 1/ and Jessica Litman's 
influentia1 1 990 study,3 scholarly interest started to b10ssom,4 and now entire 
symposia are devoted to the public domain. 5 Duke Law School even 
recently announced the donation of an anonymous $1 million gift to fund a . 
Center for the Study of the Public Domain. 6 
This article will trace the history and development of the public domain 
in the United States, from its statutory recognition in England to current U.S. 
Supreme Court doctrine. Along the way, I will examine how the "public 
domain" came to be the preferred name for material unprotected by 
intellectual property 1aw/ and I will discuss two basic issues over which 
scholars continue to disagree: whether the public domain should be 
characterized as common ownership or the absence. of ownership,8 and 
whether the public domain is irrevocab1e.9 
I An exception to the relatively recent nature of this scholarly interest is M. William 
Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain , 14 Bull. Copy. Socy. 205 ( 1 967). 
2 See generally David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain , 44 L. & Contemp. Probs. 
1 47, 1 5 1  n. 20 ( 1981)  ("I have not attempted in this essay to formulate a general public domain 
theory, although one inevitably has begun to suggest itself. 1 have simply presupposed a universal 
acknowledgement of what amounts to a dark star in the constellation of intellectual property 
and 1 have hoped to encourage a wider concern for its definition in case law and literature 
alike.") (internal citations omitted). 
3 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain , 39 Emory L.J. 965 ( 1 990). For a critique of Lange's 
and Litman's views, see Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 4 1  J. Copy. 
Socy. 1 37 ( 1 993). 
4 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain , 74 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 354 ( 1999); Malia Pollack, The Owned 
Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be Excluded-Or the Supreme Court Chose the 
Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co . ,  22 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 265 
(2000). 
5 See e.g. Duke Law, Conference on the Public Domain <http://www.law.duke.edulpd> 
(accessed Mar. 3 ,  2003); National Academies of Science, Symposium on the Role of Scientific 
and Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain 
<http://www7.nationalacademies.org/biso/ PublicDomainAbstracts.html> (accessed Mar. 3, 
2003). 
6 Duke Law, News and Events <http://www.law.duke.edulnews/currentl20020905pdic.html> 
(Sept. 5, 2002). 
7 See infra nn. 154-205 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra nn. 267-3 1 0  and accompanying text. 
9 See infra nn. 3 1 1 -333 and accompanying text. 
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Of what does the public domain consist? Often the public domain is 
defined in terms of what it is not.1O Thus, many sources simply state that the 
public domain is the body of ideas and works that are not subject to 
intellectual property protection. I I  But such a negative definition simply begs 
the question: What inventions and works are, or are not, subject to 
intellectual property protection? While a detailed answer to such a question 
would fill many mul�volume treatises,12 a brief overview is warranted. 13 
First, ever since the earliest days of patent and copyright law in 
England, the law has imposed a durational limit on patent and copyright 
protection. 14 Thus, a large portion of the public domain consists of inventions 
and works that were formerly subject to patent and copyright protection, but 
are no longer. 15 
Second, certain types of material are considered to lie outside the realm 
of patent and copyright protection. For example, copyright law does not 
10 E.g. Krasilovsky, supra n. I, at 205 ("Public domain in the fields of literature, drama, 
music and art is the other side of the coin of copyright. It is best defined in negative terms."); 1. 
Thomas Mc Carthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § I :30 (4th rev. ed., 
Clark Boardman Callaghan 2002) ("while intellectual property statutes and laws do not 
explicitly define the public domain, they do so by negative implication"). 
II E.g. Mc Carthy on Trademarks, supra n 10, at § 1:2 ("'[P]ublic domain' is the status of 
an invention, creative work, commercial symbol, or any other creation that is not protected by 
any form of intellectual property."); id. at § I :31 ("A thing is in the public domain only if no 
intellectual property right protects it."); S,amuels, supra n. 3, at 138 ("[T]he public domain is 
simply whatever remains after all methods of protection are taken into account."); Black's Law 
Dictionary 1243 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) ("The realm of publications, 
inventions and processes that are not protected by copyright or patent."). 
12 See generally Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents (Lexis 2002); Melville B. Nimmer & 
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (Lexis 2002); Paul Goldstein, Copyright (Little, Brown & 
Co. 2d ed, 2002); William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (BNA Books 1994); Mc Carthy 
on Trademarks, supra n. 10; David S. Welkowitz, Trademark Dilution: Federal, State and 
International Law (BNA Books 2002); Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets (Lexis 
2002); J. Thomas Mc Carthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2d ed., West Group 2002). 
13 For a more detailed effort, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public 
Domain: Threats and Opportunities (draft manuscript on file with author). 
14 For an overview of the English origins of patent and copyright law, see generally Tyler 
T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. 
Copy. Socy. 675, 677-84 (2002). For the history of patent and copyright terms in the United 
States, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution,  49 J. 
Copy. Socy. 19,29-46,49-58 (2002). 
15 See Krasilovsky, supra n. I, at 205 ("the majority of culturally valuable items in the 
public domain are those for which the 'limited times' of copyright permitted by the Constitution 
have expired"). 
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protect ideas,16 and patent law does not protect artistic works,17 so the ideas 
contained in all such works are in the public domain. 18 Copyright law does 
not protect statutes or judicial opinions,19 so all such works are in the public 
domain. Patent and copyright laws do not protect basic scientific principles,20 
so all such principles are in the public domain. 
Third, as to inventions and works which would otherwise be within the 
scope of patent and copyright law, those laws impose a number of 
substantive requirements on the subject matter eligible for protection. 
Inventions are not subject to patent protection unless they are useful, novel, 
and non-obvious.21 Inventions are not subject to copyright protection at all. 22 
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, . . .  concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."). 
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (patentable subject matter includes "any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof'); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 
706.03(a) (7th ed. 1998) ("a mere arrangement of printed matter, though seemingly a 
'manufacture,' is rejected as not being within the statutory classes. "). 
18 This is an oversimplification in several respects. First, a published work may describe a 
patentable invention. So long as the inventor applies for a patent within one year of the date of 
publication, the published work will not disqualify the inventor from getting a patent. See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Second, a patent may cover the utilitarian aspects of computer software, 
while copyright covers the original "expression" contained in the software. Third, a design 
patent may be granted for "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture," 35 U.S.C. § 171, while such a design may also fall within the subject matter of 
copyright to the extent it is "separable " from the utilitarian aspects of the article. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). 
19 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834) ("no reporter has or can have 
any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court."); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 
,244, 253 ( 1888); Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Congo Inti. , 293 F,3d 791,800 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) ("we read Banks, Wheaton, and related cases consistently to enunciate the principle 
that 'the law,' whether it has its source in judicial opinions or statutes, ordinances or regulations, 
is not subject to federal copyright law"). 
20 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U,S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from such patent 
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,"); Diamond v, 
Chakrabarty, 447 U,S. 303, 309 ("The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
have been held not patentable, . . .  Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; 
nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are manifestations of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.") (quotation marks and ellipsis 
omitted); 17 U,S,C, § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea . .  , concept, principle or discovery, "). 
21 See 35 U.S,C, § 101 (invention must be "new and useful"); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty); 35 
U.S.C, § 103(a) (2000) (non-obviousness). 
22 See 17 U,S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery"); 17 U,S,C. § 101 (The design of a useful article is subject to copyright 
"if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features 
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article."). This is an oversimplification in one respect: several 
provisions codified in Title 17, but outside the Copyright Act, provide sui generis protection for 
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That leaves all inventions that are. obvious, not novel, or not useful in the 
public domain. Likewise, neither patent law nor copyright law protects 
facts,23 so facts are in the public domain. Copyright law does not protect 
works (or specific elements of works) which are not original, which consist 
of familiar or expected cliches, or which are (as a practical matter) 
indispensable to the expression of an idea.24 Since patent law requires 
novelty, all such cliches, unoriginal material, and indispensable expressions 
are also part of the public domain. 
Fourth, both patent and copyright law impose certain procedural 
formalities as a condition of protection. Patent law requires government 
approval of a patent application,z5 and copyright law requires (or, rather, 
used to require) that works be published with copyright notice.26 Thus, all 
ideas and works for which the proper formalities were not followed are also 
in the public domain. 
Of course, patent and copyright are not the only types of intellectual 
property. Trademark law protects words, phrases, images, and even product 
or regulation of many types of useful articles. See e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(I) (protecting a 
"mask work fixed in a semiconductor chip product"); 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (prohibiting import, 
manufacture or distribution of "any digital audio recording device . . .  that does not conform to . 
. . the Serial Copy Management System" or its equivalent); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) 
(prohibiting manufacturing, importing, or trafficking in technology that is primarily designed, 
produced, marketed, or used for circumvention of technological protection measures); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(a) (protecting the "original design of a useful article"), 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2) (defining 
"useful article" as "a vessel hull"). 
23 See Feist Publications. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co. , 449 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (facts 
"may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person."); 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (patentable subject matter limited to "any new or useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter"). 
24 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 ("Originality is a constitutional requirement."); Hoehling V. 
Universal City Studios. Inc. , 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("These elements, however, are 
merely scenes a faire, that is, 'incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter 
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.' Because it is virtually 
impossible to write about a particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain 
'stock' or standard literary devices, we have held that scenes a faire are not copyrightable as a 
matter of law.") (citations omitted); Alexander V. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
("Yet another group of alleged infringements is best described as cliched language, metaphors and 
the very words of which the language is constructed. Words and metaphors are not subject to 
copyright protection; nor are phrases and expressions conveying an idea that can only be, or is 
typically, expressed in a limited number of stereotyped fashions."). 
25 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (written application required); 35 U.S.C. § 131 ("The Director shall 
cause an examination to be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on 
such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director 
shall issue a patent therefore."). 
26 See Stewart V. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,233 (1990) ("Under the 1909 Act, it was necessary 
to publish the work with proper notice to obtain copyright. Publication of a work without 
proper notice automatically sent a work into the public domain."). The notice requirement for 
published works was retained until the U.S. joined the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989. See 
Berne Convention Implementation Act, P.L. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
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designs that serve to identify the source of particular goods or services.27 
Moreover, unlike patent and copyright, trademark protection is potentially 
indefinite in duration. 28 However, like patent and copyright, trademark law 
does contain substantive limitations. Words, phrases, images, and product 
designs that are generic or that become generic, are in the public domain.29 
In addition, trademark law does not protect any functional aspects of 
marks,3D so words, phrases, images, and product designs that are functional 
(and not otherwise protected by copyright or patent) are in the public 
domain. And while trademark law can be said to remove certain words, 
phrases, images, and product designs from the public domain, it may be 
more accurate to say that it removes certain uses of those words, phrases, 
images, and product designs from the public domain, leaving other uses 
available to the public.31 Finally, while trademark protection is potentially 
indefmite, a mark which ceases to be used returns to the public domain. 32 
Trade secret law protects any information (including otherwise 
unprotectable facts and ideas), which gives one an advantage over one's 
competitors, and for which reasonable measures are taken to maintain its 
secrecy.33 Thus, facts and ideas that are kept secret can be kept out of the 
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of "trademark" and "service mark"); McCarthy on 
Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 3:1 ("the role that a designation must play to become a 
'trademark' is to identify the source of one seller's goods and to distinguish that source from 
other sources"). 
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (trademark registrations may be renewed every ten years); Kohler 
Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) ("trademark rights may continue as long as 
the mark is used to distinguish and identify."). 
29 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 12:2 ("Generic names are regarded by 
the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain."); First Bank v. First Bank System, 
Inc. , 84 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Generic terms are not entitled to protection under 
trademark law"); 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (trademark registration may be canceled "[a]t any time if 
the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services . . .  for which it is 
registered."). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (trademark may not be registered if it "comprises any matter 
that, as a whole, is functional."); § 1064(3) (registration may be canceled at any time if the 
registered mark is functional); § 1125(a)(3) ("the person who asserts trade dress protection has 
the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functiona1."); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co. , 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("The functionality doctrine prevents 
trademark law . . . from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to 
control a useful product feature."). 
31 See nn. 323-335 and accompanying text. 
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (trademark registration may be canceled at any time if the mark 
"has been abandoned"); § 1115 (b) ("incontestable" mark subject to defense that "the mark has 
been abandoned by the registrant"); § 1127 (defining "abandone.;I"); Mc Carthy on Trademarks, 
supra n. 10, at § 17: I ("Once held abandoned, a mark falls into the public domain and is free for 
all to use."). 
33 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (1985) ('''Trade secret' means information . . .  
that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
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public domain indefinitely.34 However, once such ideas become generally 
known, they become part of the public domain. 35 
Finally, state right of publicity laws protect the use of a person's name 
or likeness for commercial purposes.36 As with trademark law, it may be 
more accurate to say that such laws remove certain uses of the person's 
name or likeness from the public domain, leaving other uses available to the 
public.37 And, like patent and copyright, in many states the right of publicity 
lasts only for a period of specified duration.38 Because the period differs 
from state to state, the boundaries of the public domain are subject to some 
uncertainty; but generally speaking, it can be said that the name or likeness 
of a person who has been dead for a long time is in the public domain. 39 
This brief overview of the public domain makes it seem as if the public 
domain is nothing more than a mishmash of disparate types of subject 
matter, subject to varying degrees of intellectual property protection from 
many different sources. But just as physicists search for a ''unified field 
theory" that explains all of physics, the elusive question remains whether 
there is a ''unified field theory" of the public domain that can help unify and 
explain the disparate types of subject matter that are contained within it. 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 
39 (1995) ("A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or 
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential 
economic advantage over others."). 
34 See u.s. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. , 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (stating that an 
inventor "may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely"); Restatement of Torts § 
757 cmt. a (1939) (stating that trade secret protection "is not limited to a fixed number of 
years"). 
35 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. f ("Information that is 
generally known or readily ascertainable through proper means . . .  is not protectable as a trade 
secret. "); id. ("If the information has become readily ascertainable from public sources . . .  the 
information is in the public domain and no longer protectable under the law of trade secrets."); 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (excluding from the definition of "trade secret" information 
that is "generally known . . .  [or] readily ascertainable by proper means"); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Information that is public knowledge or that is 
generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret."). 
36 See McCarthy on Rights of Publicity, supra n. 12, at § 1:3 ("The right of publicity is the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity."). 
Currently, 30 states recognize the right of publicity: 12 by common law, 12 by statute, and 6 by 
both. See id. at § 6:3 (common law), § 6:8 (statute). 
37 See id. at § §  7:1-8:122 (detailing permissible and impermissible uses). 
38 See id. at § 9: 18 (in 13 states recognizing post-mortem right of publicity by statute, 
duration ranges from 10 to 100 years after death, with one having no stated duration, and 
another permitting right to continue as long as continuously used. In the four states that 
recognize a post-mortem right of publicity by common law, the question of duration has not 
been presented). 
39 See e.g. George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint, Inc. , 349 F. Supp. 255, 261 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("George Washington . . .  is a name that is publici juris. Anyone may 
appropriate it for it is in the public domain.") (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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This article does not make any claims to have discovered a unified field 
theory, but it does aspire to help advance the search. 
III. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The public domain has existed from time immemorial. As any parent 
can attest, humans learn by imitating others. From the time the first humans 
created tools or drew paintings on the walls of caves, other humans copied 
what they did. In an oral tradition, songs and stories and know-how were 
handed down from generation to generation, as children, students and 
apprentices copied and modified the art and wisdom of their parents, 
teachers and mentors.40 It was only with the invention of the printing press 
that mass reproduction became possible. Fearful that the new technology 
would be used to spread heresy and sedition, church officials and monarchs 
imposed limitations on the freedom to copy. 41 Works in the oral tradition 
remained in the public domain, but published works were subject to 
government censorship and control. 
The freedom to engage in a trade or occupation of one's choosing was 
made possible by the body of knowledge in the public domain. This freedom 
was endangered in Elizabethan England when the Queen granted a large 
number of monopolies over existing trades to favored courtiers.42 In the 
landmark case of Darcy v. Allin, the Court of King's Bench held that such 
monopolies were unlawful, because monopolies could only be granted with 
respect to new inventions and newly-introduced trades for a limited period.43 
This holding was codified in 1624 in the Statute of Monopolie s,44 which 
limited patents for new inventions to a term of 14 years45 and patents for 
existing inventions to a term of21 years.46 
Although not expressly stated, implicit in the Statute of Monopolies were 
two propositions concerning the public domain: first, that at the end of the 
40 See Mc Carthy on Trademarks,supra n. 10, at § 1:30 ("The principle of free copying is 
an inherent right of the people, and is not created by either the Constitution or any statutory 
law."). 
41 See generally Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical P�rspective 20-27 
(Nashville Vanderbilt V. Press 1968). . 
42 See generally Malia Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's Control of 
Government, 30 S.M.V. 1. Rev. 1, 40-54 (2000). 
43 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (K.B. circa 1602). 
44 Pollack, supra n. 42, at 52-79 (analyzing the common law predecessors, the text, and 
the history of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 James I, ch. 3 (1624 Eng.)}. For an overview of the 
background of the Statute, see Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 677 -79. 
45 21 James I, ch. 3, § 6 (1624 Eng.). 
46 21 James I ch. 3, § 5. 
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limited period, any person could practice the trade or invention without 
restraint; and second, that any person could practice any trade or invention 
which was not the subject of a valid patent. The Statute of Monopolies thus 
constitutes the fIrst statutory recognition of the public domain in Anglo­
American law. 
The Statute of Monopolies, however, did not affect the near-monopoly 
on printing held by the Stationers Company.47 The Stationers maintained a 
system of registration under whic h the right to publish a particular work 
could be bequeathed or sold (but only to another member of the Company) 
in perpetuity.48 In order to break the Stationers' monopoly, Parliament 
enacted the Statute of Anne in 1710.49 The Statute of Anne limited 
copyrights for new works to a term of 14 years, which could be renewed 
once, and it limited copyrights for existing works to a term of 2 1  years. 50 
Like the Statute of Monopolies, implicit in the Statute of Anne was the 
principle that when the limited term expired, the work could be published by 
anyone without restraint.51 
Despite the limited terms in the Statute of Anne, the Stationers resisted 
the conclusion that the Statute created or recognized a public domain in 
works of authorship. In a series of court cases, the Stationers argued that 
the Statute of Anne merely provided supplemental remedies to an underlying 
common-law right that was perpetual. 52 In 1774, however, the House of 
Lords ruled that copyright was limited to the term set forth in the Statute of 
Anne,53 thereby ensuring that all published works would eventually enter the 
public domain, where they could be freely copied for all to enjoy, and where 
47 21 James I ch. 3, § 9 (exception for Crown-chartered guilds). It also did not affect the 
status of previously issued printing patents. Id. at § 10. Sie generally Cyprian Blagden, The 
Stationers Company: A History, 1403-1959 (Harvard U. Press, 1960). 
48 Patterson, supra n. 41, at 28-77. 
498 Anne c. 19 (1710) (available at Karl-Erik Tallmo, The History o/Copyright: The 
Statute 0/ Anne <http://www.copyrighthistory.comlanne.html> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003» 
(reprinted in Patry, supra n. 12, at 1461-64); see generally Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 680-
81 (discussing the background of the Statute) 
508 Anne c. 19,�1 
51 See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg The Nature o/Copyright: A Law o/User's 
Rights, 29-30 (U. of Ga. Press, 1991) ("An even more notable aspect of the Statute of Anne was 
its creation of the public domain for literature . . . .  [T]he public was assured not only of access 
to copyrighted works at a fair price but eventually of ownership of the work in the public 
domain. "). 
52 See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention o/Copyright, 67-91 (Harv. Univ. 
Press, 1993); Patterson, supra n. 41, at 158-72. 
53 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 BUIT. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774) .. A more complete 
report is available at 17 ParI. His. Eng. 953. See Rose, supra n. 52, at 92-104 (providing detailed 
commentary); Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation 0/ American Copyright Law: 
Exploding the Myth 0/ Common-Law Copyright, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119, 1164-71 (1983). 
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they would provide both inspiration and raw material for the next generation 
of authors. 54 
The Framers of the u.s. Constitution recognized the importance of the 
public domain. By providing that patents and copyrights could only be 
granted "for limited Times,"55 they ensured that all patented inventions and 
copyrighted works of authorship would enter the public domain at the end of 
that limited period, just as they had in England.56 Both the Patent Act of 
179057 and the Copyright Act of 179058 provided terms of 14 years; in the 
case of copyright, the term could be renewed once. 59 As in England, it was 
argued that statutory copyright merely provided supplemental remedies for 
an underlying common-law right that was perpetual; but this argument was 
rejected by the U.s. Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters ,60 reaffIrming the 
principle that all works would eventually enter the public domain. 
The Patent Act of 1790 also required that the inventor deliver to the 
Secretary of State a written specification, which "shall be so particular . . . 
[as] to enable a workman or other person skilled in the Art or Manufacture, 
whereof it is a lranch . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end 
that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of 
the patent term. ,,61 The specification thus served the purpose of ensuring 
that the invention would enter the public domain in practice, not just in 
theory. As amended, the specification requirement was carried forward in 
the Patent Acts of 1793,62 1836,63 1870,64 and 1952.65 
The Copyright Act of 1831 extended the initial copyright term to 28 
years, with a single renewal period of 14 years.66 The Act, however, did not 
alter the public domain status of existing works; it provided, ''this act shall 
not extend to any copyright heretofore secured, the term of which has 
54 See Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 684. 
55 U.S. Const., art. J, § 8, cl. 8. 
56 See Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 685-95 (discussing the history, adoption, and 
purposes of the Patent and Copyright Clause). 
57 Congo Ch. 1-7, § 1, I Stat. 109, 110 (1790). 
58 Congo Ch. 1-15, § 1, I Stat. 124, 124-26 (1790): 
59 [d. 
60 33 U.S. 591, 592 (1834); see generally Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court 
Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 
(1985); Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 699-701. 
61 Congo Ch. 1-7, § 2, I Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (emphasis added). 
62 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 3, I Stat. 318, 321-22 (1793). 
63 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836). 64 Congo Ch. 41-230, § 22,16 Stat. 198,201 (1870). 
65 Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154,66 Stat. 792, 804 (1952). 
66 Congo 01. 21-16, § §  1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831). See generally Ochoa & Rose, 
supra n. 14, at 697-99. 
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already expired."67 Likewise, the Patent Act of 1836 allowed an inventor to 
apply for a seven-year extension of his or her tenn; but it provided, "[t]hat 
no extension of a patent shall be granted after the expiration of the tenn for 
which it originally issued. ,>68 
In 1886, ten nations signed the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works.69 Article 14 of the Convention provided as 
follows: 
Under the reserves and conditions to be detennined by common . 
agreement, the present Convention shall apply to all works which at 
the moment of its coming into force have not yet fallen into the 
public domain in the country of origin. 70 
This article incorporated the tenn "public domain" from French 
copyright law.71 (Like England and the United States, France had provided a 
limited tenn of copyright in its 1791 and 1793 copyright decrees.72) The 
article permitted works in the public domain of any member nation to remain 
in the public domain in that nation. 
In the Berlin revision of 1908, Article 7 provided a minimum tenn of 
"life of the author and fifty years after his death.'>73 Article 14 was 
renumbered Article 18, and the phrase "through the expiration of the tenn of 
protection" was added at the end of the text,74 requiring member nations to 
remove works from the public domain if they were there for some reason 
other than the tXpiration of the copyright tenn. A proviso was added to 
Article 18, which read: 
If, however, through the expiration of the tenn of protection which 
was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of 
67 Congo Ch. 21-16, §§ 1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. at 439. 
68 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124-25 (1836). In 1861, the term of a patent was 
changed to 17 years, and extensions were prohibited. Congo Ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249. The 
change was prospective only, so it had no effect on existing inventions already in the public 
domain. For a more complete history of patent terms, see Ochoa, supra note 14, at 51-58. 
69 Convention Concerning the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, ("Berne Convention") Item A-I (Sept. 9, 1886), Copyright Laws 
and Treaties of the World (UNESCO 1997). 
70Id. at art. 14. 
71 The original French text of Art. 14 reads: "Le presente Convention . . .  s'applique Ii 
toute les oeuvres qui, au moment de son entree en vigeur, ne sont pas encore tombees dans Ie 
domaine public dans leurs pays d'origine." 168 CTS 185, 191. 
72 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale if Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 1005-14 (1990). 
73 Berne Convention, Item Cl, art. 7 (Nov. 13, 1908) (Berlin Revision); Copyright Laws 
and Treaties of the World, (UNESCO 1997) . 
. 74 Id. at art. 18. 
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the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be 
protected anew in that country. 75 
Although it limited the role of formalities in placing works in the public 
domain, Article 18 recognized that works already in the public domain by 
reason of expiration need not be removed from the public domain 
retroactively. With minor changes in language, these two paragraphs have 
been included in each subsequent revision of the Convention. 76 
The 1909 Copyright Act used the phrase "public domain" for the fIrst 
time in U.S. copyright law. The Act increased the renewal term of 
copyright to 28 years,77 but it specifIcally provided that the new term would 
not apply to works already in the public domain.78 Section 7 read as follows: 
[N]o copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is 
in he public domain, or in any work which was published in this 
country or any foreign country prior to the going into effect of this 
Act and has not been already copyrighted in the United States, or in 
any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint, in 
whole or in part, thereof . 79 
Section 6 of the Act provided for copyright protection of derivative 
works: 
[C]ompilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, 
dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public 
domain, CI" of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of 
the proprietor of the copyright in such works .. . shall be regarded 
75 /d. at � 2. 
76 See Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2) (June 2, 1928) (Rome Revision), Copyright Laws 
and Treaties of the World, Item B-1, 5 (UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2) 
(June 26, 1948) (Brussels Revision), Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item F-I, 6 
(UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2) (July 14, 1967) (Stockholm Revision), 
Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item G-I, 8 (UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art. 
18(1), 18(2) (July 24, 1971) (Paris Revision), Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item 
H-I, 8 (UNESCO 1997). 
77 Congo Ch. 60-320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909). The maximum total duration was 
thus increased to 56 years from the date of first publication. For the legislative history of this 
extension, see Ochoa, supra n. 68, at 33-39. 
78 Copyrights "subsisting . . .  at the time when this Act goes into effect" were given the 
benefit of the extension, but not those, which had already expired. Cong Ch. 60-320, § 24, 35 
Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909). 
79 Id. at 1077. This language originated in § 30 of a memorandum draft bill prepared by 
Register of Copyrights Thorvald Solberg, dated October 23, 1905. See E. Fulton Brylawski & 
Abe Goldman, Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, Dxxix-xxx (Fred B. Rothman & 
Co. 1976). Although not expressly stated, it is likely that Solberg's choice of language was 
influenced by the use of this phrase in the Berne Convention. 
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as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this Act; 
but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force 
or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or 
any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such 
use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such 
original works.80 
227 
Under this section, a revision of a work in the public domain could 
qualify for copyright protection, but it would not affect the public domain 
status of the underlying work. 81 Thus, in both sections, Congress expressed 
the view that once a work had entered the public domain, it should remain in 
the public domain. 
The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 was created to provide a 
multilateral copyright treaty that the United States and other countries 
outside the Berne Union could join without changing their domestic law.82 
Article 7 provided that: 
This Convention shall not apply to works or rights in works which, 
at the effective .date of the Convention in a Contracting State where 
protection is claimed, are permanently in the public domain in the 
said Contracting State. 83 
Unlike Revised Article 18 of the Berne Convention, which required 
retroactive protection if the work was in the public domain for some reason 
other than expiration,84 this article permitted states to forego retroactive 
protection if a work was in the public domain for any reason, including the 
failure to comply with formalities imposed by domestic law. The same 
provision was carried over in the 1971 Paris Revision of the UC.C.85 
80 Copyright Act of 1909, § 6, 35 Stat. at 1077. 
81 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 231 (1990) (explaining the effect of this section); 
id. at 234 (explaining that "if an author attempts to copyright a novel, e.g., about Cinderella, 
and the story elements are already in the public domain, the author holds a copyright in the 
novel, but may receive protection only for his original additions to the Cinderella story"). It 
should be noted that a new Section 6 was adde'd in 1947 and that all of the succeeding sections 
were renumbered. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, 654. Stewart therefore refers 
to this Section throughout as Section 7. 
82 See Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice 28 (Oxford U. 
Press, Inc. 2001). For that reason, the Convention permitted the imposition of formalities and 
permitted the duration <f copyright to be measured from the date of first publication. See 
Universal Copyright Convention (Geneva Text) art. 3 (formalities), art. 4 (duration) (Sept. 6, 
1952). 
83 1d. art. 7. 
84 See supra nn. 69-76 and accompanying text. 
85 See Universal Copyright Convention (Paris Text) art.7 (July 24,1971). 
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 228 2002-2003
228 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW [Vo1.28:2 
The 1976 Copyright Act recognized the public domain in a number of 
ways, including codifYing limiting principles that had been developed in 
previous statutes or case law. Section 102(a) limits copyrightable subject 
matter to "original work[ s] of authorship," thereby leaving facts in the public 
domain.86 Section 1 02(b) codified the prohibition on copyright protection for 
ideas.87 Section 103 provides that "[t]he copyright in a compilation or 
derivative work . . . does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting 
material."88 The House Report states that under this section, "copyright in a 
'new version' covers only the material added by the later author, and has no 
effect one way or the other on the copyright or public domain status of the 
preexisting material. ,,89 Section 105 continued the prohibition on copyright 
for works of the U.S. Government.90 The House Report says "section 105 is 
intended to place all works of the United States Government, published or 
unpublished, in the public domain.'>91 The Act eliminated state common-law 
copyright, meaning that unpublished works would eventually enter the public 
domain for the first time.92 Section 301(a) also preempted state laws 
providing rights "equivalent" to copyright.93 The House Report explained 
that "[a]s long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter 
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from 
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it 
is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into 
8617 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 355; see 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2001) ("The following 
are examples of works not subject to copyright . . .  (d) Works consisting entirely of information 
that is common propert y containing no original authorship, such as, for example: Standard 
calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers, schedules of sporting ev�nts, and 
lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources."). 
87 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see Baker v. Selden., 101 U.S. 99,107 (1880). 
8 8 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
89 H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 57 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670). 
90 17 U.S.C. § lOS (2000). 
91 H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 59 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5673). 
92 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 130 (reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746) (" Common law protection in 'unpublished' works is now perpetual, no 
matter how widely they may be disseminated by means other than 'publication'; the bill would 
place a time limit on the duration of exclusive rights in them."). The time limit chosen was life 
of the author plus 50 years, or the lesser of 75 years from publication or 100 years from 
creation for works made for hire, subject to a statutory minimum of 25 years for works that 
remained unpublished, and 50 years for works published before the end of 2002. 17 U.S.C. § 303 
(as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 303, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573 (1976» (the current version of 
this statute includes the above provisions as subsection (a». 
93 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 130-31 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5746) ("Regardless of when the work was created and whether it is published or unpublished, 
disseminated or undisseminated, in the public domain or copyrighted under the Federal statute, 
the States cannot offer it protection equivalent to copyright."). 
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the public domain."94 All of these provisions help ensure that certain types of 
raw material remain in the public domain. 
Somewhat inconsistently, however, Congress also expressed great 
skepticism about the benefits of the public domain. In addressing the 
question of copyright duration, it said: 
Although limitations on the term of copyright are obviously 
necessary, too short a term harms the author without giving any 
substantial benefit to the public. The public frequently pays the 
same for works in the public domain as it does for copyrighted users 
at the author's expense. In some cases the lack of copyright 
protection actually restrains dissemination of the work, since 
publishers and other users cannot risk investing in the work unless 
assured of exclusive rightS.95 
Congress also expressed dismay that, as a result of increases in life 
expectancy, "more and more authors are seeing their works fall into the 
public domain during their lifetimes, forcing later works to compete with 
their own early works in which copyright has expired.,,96 In so stating, 
Congress appeared to be unconcerned about the effect of term extension on 
authors and artists who rely upon the public domain to provide raw material 
for their own creations.97 Should not an artist live . long enough to see the 
familiar works of his or her childhood enter the public domain, so that the 
artists most directly affected by a work may live to respond artistically to it? 
In addition, some scholars have challenged Congress' unsupported empirical 
assertions about the role of the public domain in encouraging the 
dissemination of older works.98 Despite these concerns, Congress enacted in 
the 1976 Act a term of life of the author plus 50 years for works created on 
or after January 1, 1978;99 and it increased the term of existing copyrights to 
94Id. at 131 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5747). 
95Id. at 134 (reprinted in 1976 U.S. C.C.A.N. at 5750). 
96 Id. 
97 Cf Sen. Rpt. 104-315, at 32 (July 10, 1996) (Minority Views of Mr. Brown) ("in part, 
the incentive to create comes from the public domain works which can inspire, be borrowed 
from, and improved upon. We do not necessarily provide an incentive to create by reducing the 
public domain."). 
98 See e.g. Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 326-27 (1970). 
99 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 �at. 2541, 2572 
(1976» (the currently enacted version of this statute extends the applicable term to 70 years). 
Works made for hire were given a single term of 75 years from first publication or 100 years 
from creation, whichever was shorter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 
302, 90 Stat. at 2572 (1976» (the currently enacted version of this statute gives works made for 
hire a term of 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever was 
shorter). 
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75 years from the date of first pUblication. 100 Congress specifically provided 
that "[t]his Act does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes 
into the public domain before January 1 ,  1978";101 however, as a result of 
nine interim copyright extensions enacted while the 1976 Act was pending, 
the only works which were in the public domain by reason of age alone (as 
opposed to failure to comply with the required formalities, such as renewal) 
were works which had been copyrighted prior to September 19, 1906.102 
The U.S. finally acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989. 103 When 
Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act,l04 however, it 
declined to remove any material from the public domain,105 despite the 
apparent command of Article 18. 106 Five years later, however, when the 
GATTrrRIPs Agreement made the provisions of Berne enforceable 
between nations through the mechanism of the World Trade Organization,107 
Congress "restored" the copyrights of certain works of foreign origin in 
compliance with Article 18  of Berne.108 As amended, Section 104A defmes 
a "restored work" as: 
100 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (works in initial term); § 304(b) (works in �enewal term) (as enacted 
in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. at 2573-74. (1976». The currently enacted versions of 
these statutes have extended the maximum term for these works to 95 years from first 
publication. 
101 Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 103, 90 Stat. at 2599 (1976); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 180 
(reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5796) ("Since there can be no protection for any work that 
has fallen into the public domain before January I, 1978, Sec. 103 makes it clear that lost or 
expired copyrights cannot be revived under the bill."). 
102 . See Ochoa, supra n. 68, at 39-42. 
103 See supra n. 76, at Item H-2, 3. 
104 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988). 
105 Id. ("Title 17 . . .  as amended by this Act, roes not provide copyright protection for 
any work that is in the public domain in the United States."); Sen. Rpt. 100-352, at 48 
(reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3746) ("Section 12 provides that no retroactive 
protection is provided for any work that is in the public domain in the United States .. " The 
obligations of the United States under the Berne Convention therefore will apply only to works 
which are protected in the United States on the effective date of this Act or to works which 
subsequently become subject to such protection. "). 
106 Article 18 obligates member nations to retroactively protect works, which were in the 
public domain for reasons other than the expiration of protection. See supra nn. 73-76 and 
accompanying text. Congress apparently overlooked the fact that many works were in the 
public domain in the U.S. for failure to comply with formalities, such as copyright notice. See 
Sen. Rpt. 100-352, at 48 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746) ("In effect, this means that 
if a work has enjoyed protection in the United States, either as an unpublished or as a published 
work, and has subsequently had its term of protection expire there is no obligation to renew 
protection in that work. "). 
107 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 9(1), art. 64 (April 15, 1994). 
108 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2002). For the legislative history of this section, see Uruguay 
Rounds Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action (reprinted in Nimmer, supra n. 
12, at App. 44-20 to 44-28). 
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an original work of authorship that . . .  is not in the "public domain in 
its source country through expiration of term of protection; [but] is 
in the public domain in the United States due to (i) noncompliance 
with formalities imposed at any time by United States copyright law, 
including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to 
comply with any manufacturing requirements; (ii) lack of subject 
matter protection in the case of sound recordings fIxed before 
February 15, 1972; or (iii) lack of national eligibility. 109 
231 
In addition, the work had to have at least one author who was a national 
of an "eligible" country; I 10 and if published, it must have been fIrst published 
in an eligible country and not have been simultaneously published in the 
U. S. I I I  If those conditions were met, the work had its copyright restored in 
the U.S.1 12 The duration of the restored copyright is "the remainder of the 
term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted in the 
United States if the work [had] never entered the public domain in the 
United States.'>113 It remains an open question whether such restoration 
violates the U.S. Constitution. 1 14 
Finally, in 1998 Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, adding 20 years to the terms of all existing and future 
copyrights. I I S  In doing so, Congress once again expressed great skepticism 
concerning the benefIts of the public domain.1 1 6  As in the 1976 Act, 
109 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B)-(C). 
1 10 [d. at (h)(6)(D). An "eligible country" is defined as one that is a member of the WTO, 
or that adheres to the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, or that is the subject of a Presidential Proclamation 
concerning reciprocity. [d. at (h)( l ). I I I  17 U.S.C. § 104(h)(6)(D). By international convention, simultaneous publication means 
publication within 30 days of the date of first publication. [d. 
1 1 2 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(I)(A) (" Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in 
restored works, and vests automatically oil the date of restoration. "). 
1 13 [d. at (a)(l )(B). 
1 14 See Nimmer, supra n. 12, at § 1.05[A][2]; Golan v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 01-B-1854 (D. 
Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001). The complaint and other documents are available at The Berkman 
Center for Law and Society, Openlaw: Golan v. . Ashcroft 
<http://eon.law.harvard.eduJopenlaw/golanvashcroft> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003). 
1 1 5 Pub. L. No. 1 05-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § §  302-304). 
1 16 See Sen. Rpt. 104-315, at 14 (July 10, 1996) ("Many of the works we wish to preserve, 
including the motion pictures and musical works from the 1920's and 1930's that form such an 
extraordinary part of our Nation's cultural heritage, will soon fall into the public domain."); H.R. 
Rpt. 105-452, at § 5 (Mar. 18, 1998) ("Upon the expiration of the copyright term, the work 
falls into the public domain. This means that anyone may perform the work, display the work, 
make copies of the work, distribute copies of the work, and create derivative works based on the 
work without first having to get authorization from the copyright holder. Essentially, the 
copyright holder no longer has the exclusive ability to exploit the work to their financial gain 
and no longer 'owns' the work."). While these statements may sound neutral, they were part of 
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however, Congress did not attempt to revive any copyrights, which had 
already entered the public domain. 1 1 7 The u.s. Supreme Court recently held 
that the CTEA does not violate either the "limited Times" requirement of 
the Patent and Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. 1 18 
IV. CHARACTERIZING AND NAMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
A. Public Property and Common Property 
Semantically speaking, it could be said that during the first 100 years of 
our nation's history, "the public domain" did not exist. That is because the 
term "public domain" was not applied to intellectual property in the U.S. 
until the 1890s.119 Instead, during most of the 1 9th Century the most frequent 
characterization applied to inventions or works, which were not protected by 
patent or copyright, by counsel and judge alike, was "public property."120 
The term was applied to patentsl21 and copyrightsl22 whose terms had 
Congress ' justification for enacting term extension and delaying the entry of such works into the 
public domain. In other words, allowing works to enter the public domain was something to be 
condemned, or at least only grudgingly tolerated, rather than something to be celebrated. 
11 7 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) ("Any copyright in its renewal term at the time that the 5bnny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act becomes effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years 
from the date copyright was originally secured."); see Sen. Rpt. 104-315, at 20 ("It is not the 
Committee 's intent that copyright be restored to public domain works."). 
1 18 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). See infra nn. 261-266 and accompanying 
text. The briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court are available online at Eldred v. Ashcroft, Legal 
Documents <http://eldred.cc/legal/> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003). For an lIlalysis of the Supreme 
Court's opinion, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Reflections on Eldred v. Ashcroft: Past, Present and 
Future, 50 J. Copy. Socy. (forthcoming 2003). 
1 19 See infra nn. 154-72 and accompanying text. 
120 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 378 (1822) (Mr. Sergeant, counsel for defendant) 
("At the expiration of the period, the thing thus secured is to become public property, which 
any one is at liberty to use."); id. at 425 (majority opinion of Story, J.) (rejecting argument that 
a witness should have been disqualified for having an interest in the outcome: "If the patent is 
declared void, the invention may be used by the whole community, and all persons may be said 
to have an interest in making it public property."); id. at 447 (Livingston, J., dissenting) ("The 
old machine still remains public property; [and] may be used by every one."). 
121 E.g. U.S. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. , 167 U.S. 224,243 (1897) ("On March 7, 1876, patent 
No. 174,465 was issued to Alexander Graham Bell . . . .  That patent has expired and all the 
monopoly which attaches to it alone has ceased, and the right to use that invention has become 
public property."); McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 406 (1857) (referring to an invention 
"of Mc Cormick, patented in 1834, which is now public property"); Atty. Gen. v. Rumford Chem. 
Works, 32 F. 608, 617 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876) (an invention "becomes public property at the 
expiration of the term of the patent . . .  "); Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979, 983 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 
1857) ("at the expiration of the patent .. . his invention becomes public property"); 
Wintermute v. Redington, 30 F. Cas. 367, 369 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1856) ("the consideration for 
which the patent issues to him, is the benefit he confers on the community, by his discovery 
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expired, to patents which were invalid,123 to material disclosed but not 
claimed in a patent,124 to material for which no patentl25 or copyrightl26 could 
be obtained, and to material for which no patentl27 or copyrightl28 had been 
obtained. Thus, one judge explained: 
eventually becoming public property"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1829) (Mr. 
Sergeant, for the defendant) ("Patents are intended to be granted for a limited time, beginning 
with the invention . . . .  [A]t the expiration of the time, the thing invented is public 
property."). 
122 E.g. Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co. , 47 F. 411, 413 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891) 
("as the copyright on that edition has expired, it has now become public property. Any one may 
reprint that edition of the work . . .  "); Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co. ,  43 F. 450, 451 (C.C.E.D. 
Mo. 1890) ("When a man takes out a copyright, for any of his writings or works, he impliedly 
agrees that, at the expiration of that copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and 
become public property . . . .  The copyright law gives an author or proprietor a monopoly of 
the sale of his writings for a definite period, but the grant of a monopoly implies that, after the 
monopoly has expired, the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use of the 
book."). 
123 E.g. Evans, 20 U.S. at 425 (Story, J.) ("If the patent is declared void, the invention 
may be used by the whole community . . .  making it public property."); Thompson v. Haight, 23 
F. Cas. 1040, 1047 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) ("The right he once had was lost. It had become public 
property."). 
1 24 E.g. Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884) ("Of course, what is not claimed is 
public property. The presumption is, and such is generally the fact, that what is not claimed was 
not invented by the patentee, but vas known and used before he made his invention. But, 
whether so or not, his own act has made it public property if it was not so before."); Miller v. 
Brass Co. ,  104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) ("[T]he claim of a specific device or combination, and an 
omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, 
a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed. "). 
125 E.g. Carr v. Rice, 5 F. Cas. 140, 143 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) ("If [the invention] has been 
previously in public use, or can be found described in substance, in printed publications, it is 
public property, and the law does not permit it to be appropriated, by means of a patent grant, 
to individuals."); Many v. Sizer, 16 F. Cas. 684, 684 (C.C.D. Mass. 1849) ("[I]f the thing they 
produce existed before, though they might have been ignorant of it, they can not take and hold 
any exclusive right to what before was public property."); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 231 
(1832) (Mr. Webster, for plaintiffs in error) ("The invention, by a single month's use, 
unprotected by a patent, becomes public property . . .  "). 
126 See e.g. Callahan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 645 (1888) ("The broad proposition is 
contended for by the defendants, that these law reports are public property, and are not 
susceptible of private ownership, and cannot be the subject of copyright under the legislation of 
Congress."); Banks v. Manchester, 23 F. 143, 145 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885) ("It is in accordance 
with sound public policy . . .  to regard the authoritative expositions of the law by the regularly 
constituted judicial tribunals as public property, to be published freely by any one who may 
choose to publish them."), aff'd, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); see Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 650 
(1834) (Mr. Sergeant, for the defendants) ("The law is not established, at least it has not been so 
declared, that [judicial] reports can be private property. Essentially, their contents are public 
property."); id. at 668 ("[T]he courts are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can 
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court. "). 
127 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 856 (D. Pa. 1816) ("If Stouffer was the original 
inventor of the hopperboy and chose not to obtain a patent for it, it became public property by 
his abandonment."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 16 U.S. 454 (1818); Evans v. Hettick, 8 F. 
Cas. 861, 867-68 (E.D. Pa. 1818) ("If [the inventor] has not chosen to ask for a monopoly, but 
abandons it to the public, then it becomes public property, and any person has a right to use 
it."), aff'd, 20 U.S. 453 (1822). 
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[W]hether the inventor gratuitously throws open his invention to the 
public, or whether it becomes known by other means; whether the 
patent expires by its own limitation, or is declared void by judgment 
of law,? is perfectly immaterial . . . . The invention is then the 
property of the public . . .  129 
Courts of this era emphasized two characteristics, which attached to 
such "public property." First, any member of the public could make, use or 
sell the invention, 130 or publish the work. 13 I  Second, this "public property" 
was irrevocable. Once something had become public property, it was 
beyond the power of the government to privatize it by granting a new 
patentl32 or copyright.133 
128 E.g. Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co. ,  14 F. 728, 730 (N.D. Ill. 1883) ("If [a person] 
publishes anything of which he is the author or compiler . . .  without protecting it by copyright, 
it becomes public property, and any person who chooses to do so has the right to republish it."); 
Lawrence v. Dana, IS  F. Cas. 26, 52 (D. Mass. 1869) ("[N]ew matter made or composed 
afterwards, requires a new copyright, and if none is taken out, the matter becomes public 
property, just as the original book would have become if a copyright for it had never been 
secured.") . 
1 29 Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047. 
130 E.g. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19 (public use of an invention before application "giv[es] the 
public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as 
possible . . .  "); Allen v. Hunter, I F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855) ("[W]hen the patent shall 
expire and the invention or discovery shall become public property, any one skilled in the art or 
science may construct or compound it."); Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 867-68 ("If [the inventor] has not 
chosen to ask for a monopoly, but abandons it to the public, then it becomes public property, 
and any person has a right to use it."); cf McCormick v. Manny, I S  F. Cas. 1314, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 
1856) ("This patent having expired, whatever of invention it contained, now belongs to the 
public, and may be used by any one."). 
131 E.g. Banks, 23 F. at 145 (judicial reports are "public property, to be published freely by 
any one who may choose to publish them"), ajJ'd, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Clemens, 14 F. at 730 
("If [a person] publishes anything of which he is the author or compiler . . .  without protecting 
it by copyright, it becomes public property, and any person who chooses to do so has the right 
to republish it. "). 
132 E.g. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16 ("It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an 
inventor may abaI)don his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public. This inchoate 
right, thus once gone, cannot afterwards be resumed at his pleasure; for, where gifts are once 
made to the public in this way, they become absolute."); Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047 ("It had 
become public property. And, I maintain, with confidence, the broad principle that congress had 
no authority to grant a monopoly of a thing which is known, and in common use . . . .  [T]he 
enjoyment of it can never again be made exclusive, in the hands of an individual."); id. at 1048 
("[T]he invention or improvement for which [the patent] was granted had passed into common 
and general use. Congress possessed no right or power to make it private property again."); 
Grant, 31 U.S. at 231 (Mr. Webster, for plaintiffs in error) ("The invention, by a single month's 
use, unprotected by a patent, becomes public property and can never be resumed.") (emphasis 
added). 
133 E.g. Merriam ,  43 F. at 451 ("[T]he grant of a monopoly implies that, after the 
monopoly has expired, the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use of the 
book.") (emphasis added). 
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Another frequent characterization of matter not protected by patent or 
copyright was "common property." This characterization was most often 
applied to fundamental ideas or principles which could not be patented or 
copyrighted under any circumstances,134 but it was also applied to inventions 
which were not novel,135 or were obvious/36 or for which no patent 
application was made.13 7  "Common property" was sometimes used 
interchangeably with "public property,"138 indicating that the two tenns 
134 E.g. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-0 1 ("Where the truths of a science or the methods of an 
art are the common property of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or 
explain and use the other, in his own way."); Wall v. Leek, 66 F. 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1895) ("A 
principle, considered as a natural physical force, is not the product of inventive skill. It is the 
common property of all mankind."); Detmold v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1851) 
("The more comprehensive truths of all philosophy . . .  can not be specially appropriated by 
any one . . . .  If we could search the laws of nature, they would be, like water and the air, the 
common property of mankind . . .  "): 
135 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 498 (Mr. Hopkinson & Mr. Sergeant, counsel for 
defendant) ("[E]very thing known by use, or described in books, might be considered as common 
property."); Wood v. Williams, 30 F. Cas. 485, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1834) ("They [the public] have 
the same interest in every suit, in which the validity of a patent is contested; for if it be 
defeated, the pretended invention becomes a common property, as fully as if the letters patent 
had been repealed by the proceeding here adopted."); In re Faure 's Appeal, 19 D.C. 259, 268-69 
(1890) (affirming denial of patent for lack of novelty) ("The subject of a patent, in the absence 
of a specific grant from the Government, belongs to the public as common property."). 
136 E.g. Lovell Mfg. Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623, 636 ( 1 893) ("The method of the patent, 
already in use, thus occurred to Cary; but he was appropriating a method which was common 
property. When steel was adopted for the first time in any art, it was natural that existing 
methods of treating it should be applied to its new use in the given art. "). 
137 See e.g. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 674 (1846) ("At common law, the better 
opinion, probably, is, that the right of property of the inventor to his invention or discovery 
passed from him as soon as it went into public use with his consent; it was then regarded as 
having been dedicated to the public, as common property, and subject to the common use and 
enjoyment of all."); Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23 ("If the public were already in possession and 
common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for 
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to 
monopolize that which was already common."). 
138 E.g. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 623 (1888) ("[The answer] avers that all 
matters contained in the volumes are public and common property, forming part of the law of 
the State of Illinois, and as such not susceptible of copyright, or in any manner literary 
property, in which a private citizen can have a monopoly."); Edgarton v. Furst & Bradley Mfg. 
Co. , 9 F. 450, 459 (N.D. Ill. 1881) ("I have therefore come finally and firmly to the conclusion 
that these treadles were old and common property at the time this patent was issued . . . .  They 
were public property, and sold on the market long before the expiration of two years prior to 
the application for this patent."); Pennock, 27 U.S. at 8 (Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant) 
("[T]he invention had been completed and published in the year 1811, seven years before the 
application. . . .  [D]uring all that period, it had been known and used a s  common public 
property, (and not as private property) which any one might use as publicly known."); Evans, 
20 U.S. at 386-87 (Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant) ("Does it follow, that if a machine has not 
been patented, he who improves upon it has a right to appropriate the whole to himself, and 
withdraw what was before public property from the public use? . . .  What was common property 
remains so; the patentee of the improvement is at liberty to use it because it is common, and no 
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meant the same thing. Indeed, as with "public property," courts emphasized 
that any person was free to use "common property,"139 and they analogized 
such "common property" to elements of the natural environment, such as 
water and air, which were free for all to use.140 
Occasionally, courts would also use the Latin phrase "publici juris," 
meaning "of public right," 141 as a synonym for "public property."142 The 
phrase fell out of favor for several decades, but it was revived in the late 
1800s.143 The fIrst edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1891, 
demonstrates the close connection between the two phrases and the phrase 
"common property." The defInition of "public property" is: 
This term is commonly used as a designation of those things which 
are publici juris, (q.v. ,) and therefore considered as being owned 
legislation was necessary to enable him; but he is not allowed to appropriate it to himself to the 
exclusion of others. ") (emphasis omitted). 
139 E.g. Wilson, 45 U.S. at 674 (Common property is "subject to the common use and 
enjoyment of all."); Wall, 66 F. at 557-58 ("A principle . . .  is the common property of all 
mankind. . . .  Man can discover and employ it, but . . .  every man is able to perceive and 
reproduce as well as he. All endeavors to confine it to himself are at once futile and unjust. It 
exists for all men, as well after his discovery as before. "). 
140 E.g. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) ("The right thus secured by the copyright 
act is not a right to the use of certain words, because they are the common property of the 
human race, and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight."); Detmold, 7 
F. Cas. at 549 ("The more comprehensive truths of all philosophy . . . can not be specially 
appropriated by any one. They are almost elements of our being. . . .  [TJhey belong to us as 
effectively as any of the gifts of Heaven. If we could search the laws of nature, they would be, 
like water and the air, the common property of mankind; and those theories of the learned 
which we dignify with this title, partake, just so far as they are true, of the same universally 
diffused ownership."); Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1048 ("Knowledge, diffused, is as common to the 
use and enjoyment of mankind as the atmosphere in which we live and move."). 
141 Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 11, at 1244. 
142 E.g. Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047 ("The right he once had was lost. It had become 
public property. . . .  It is, then, publici juris, and the enjoyment of it can never again be made 
exclusive, in the hands of an individual.") (emphasis added); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 
208 (E.D. Pa. 1853) ("By the publication of Mrs. Stowe' s  book, the creations of the genius and 
imagination of the author have become as much public property as those of Homer or 
Cervantes. (Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much publici juris as Don Quixote and Sancho 
Panza.) ") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
143 See Barber v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. ,  15 F. 312, 318 (N.D.N.Y. 1883) ("Where the 
name, trade-mark, or symbols are words publici juris,-that is, words which the public have a 
right to use,-their use will not be enjoined."); Black v. Henry G. Allen Co. ,  42 F. 618, 620 
(S.D.N.Y. 1890) (May a person "publish in this country the copyrighted article as a part of his 
reprint of such encyclopaedia, the remainder of which is publici juris?" ); Black v. Henry G. Allen 
Co. ,  56 F. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("[AJ copyright of a single article bound up in a volume, 
the bulk of which is publici juris, is valid against any unpermitted reprint of the copyrighted 
book.") (emphasis added); cf Ency. Britannica Co. v. Am. Newsp. Assn.,  130 F. 460, 466 (D.N.I. 
1904) ("By the demurrer the Henry G. Allen Company raised the question whether they had not 
the legal right to sell an American edition of the Encyclopaedia Br itannica which should contain, 
not only the parts of the Edinburgh edition which were admittedly publici juris and could not be 
copyrighted in the United States, but also the articles in the Edinburgh edition which had been 
copyrighted in the United States.") (emphasis added). 
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by ''the public," the entire state or community, and not restricted to 
the dominion of a private person. 144 
The definition of "publici juris" is: 
Lat. Of public right This term, as applied to a thing or right, means 
that it is open to or exercisable by all �rsons. When a thing is 
common property, so that any one can make use of it who likes, it is 
said to be 'Publici juris;" as in the case of light, air, and public 
water. 145 
237 
There is no entry for "common property," but the adjective "common" 
is defined to mean "shared among several; owned by several jointly."146 
Thus, matter that was not protected by intellectual property law was 
considered to be a true commons, owned jointly by the public at large and 
free for all to use. 
The most famous use of the phrase 'publici juris" came in 1918, in 
International News Service v. Associated Press. 147 In dicta, the majority 
remarked that there could not be a valid copyright in facts (as opposed to 
expression): 
But the news element-the information respecting current events 
contained in the literary production-is not the creation of the 
writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it 
is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the framers of 
the Constitution, when they empowered Congress ''to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries" (Const., Art I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon 
one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the 
exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it. 148 
Less well known is the following passage, which uses "common 
property" as a synonym for ''publici juris." 
144 Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary 963 (1st ed., West 1891). The entry 
adds: "It may also apply to any subject of property owned by a state, nation, or municipal 
corporation as such." Id. 
145 Id. at 965. The entry adds "Or it designates things which are owned by 'the public'; that 
is, the entire state or community, and not by any private person." Id. 
1 46 Id. at 230. 
147 248 U.S. 215,234 (1918). 
148 Id. 
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[E]xcept for matters improperly disclosed, or published in breach of 
trust or confidence, or in violation of law, none of which is involved 
in this branch of the case, the news of current events may be 
regarded as common property. 149 
Of course, despite its ringing endorsement of news as common 
property, the maprity went on to uphold a preliminary injunction against 
International News Service, prohibiting it from systematically copying 
Associated Press's uncopyrighted news dispatches and selling them in 
competition with Associated Press's.lso Justices Holmes, McKenna and 
Brandeis dissented,lsl  and the language of Brandeis' opinion is as famous as 
the majority's: 
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions­
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common 
use. I S2 
Once again, the analogy between intellectual property and the 
environmental commons is drawn. This analogy is reinforced by the fact 
that contemporary opinions also use the phrase "publici juris" to refer to 
common ownership of natural resources such as water. IS3 Thus, although 
149 Id. at 235. 
150 Id. at 245-46. In another famous passage, the majority laid the foundations of the still­
troublesome misappropriation doctrine. Id. at 239-40 ("In doing this defendant, by its very act, 
admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of 
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant 
for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap 
where it has not sown, and . . .  is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown."). I S I /d. at 246 (Holmes & McKenna, JJ., dissenting); id. at 248 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
I S2 Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
153 E.g. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 103 (1907) ("The right to flowing water is now well 
settled to be a right incident to property it the land; it is a right publici juris, of such a 
character, that whilst it is common and equal to all, through whose land it runs, and no one can 
obstruct or divert it, yet, as one of the beneficial gifts of P�ovidence, each proprietor has a right 
to a just and reasonable use of it, as it passes through his land.") (quoting Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. 
Co. , 64 Mass. 191, 193, 196 (Mass. 1852»; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. , 113 U.S. 9, 23 (1885) 
("The right to the use of running water is publici juris, and common to all the proprietors of the 
bed and banks of the stream from its source to its outlet. Each has a right to the reasonable use 
of the water as it flows past his land, not interfering with a like reasonable use by those above or 
below him."); Mohl v. Lamar Canal Co. , 128 F. 776, 778 (C.C.D. Colo. 1904) ("The waters of 
flowing streams are publici juris [sicj-the gift of God to all His creatures."); Ill. Central R.R. Co. 
v. Ill. ,  146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892) ("The shore and lands under water of the navigable st reams and 
waters of the province of New Jersey . . .  were held by the state . . .  in trust for the public uses of 
navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and 
other facilities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris ; 
in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large.") (quoting Stockton v. 
Baltimore & N. Y. Rail Co. , 32 F. 9, 19-20 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887». 
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the judges disagreed about the scope of unfair competition, it appears they 
agreed that information, which was not subject to any type of intellectual 
property law, was held in common by the public, and free for anyone to use. 
B. Naming the Public Domain 
During the first century of the United States' existence, the phrase 
"public domain" was used almost exclusively to refer to land owned by the 
government.154 The phrase was used to refer to an expired patent in only 
two intellectual property cases prior to 1 896. 155 In Wheeler v. 
McCormick,156 in response to an argument that "the invention patented . . .  
became, on the expiration of the term, public property," 157 the court said: 
I am of opinion that nothing fell into the public domain, on the 
expiration of that patent, except the special device claimed in it, and 
154 E.g. Black 's Law Dictionary, supra n. 144, at 385 ("The public lands of a state are 
frequently termed the 'public domain' . . .  "); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. 518, 695 ( 1819) ("Titles to land, constituting part of the public domain, acquired by grants 
under the provisions of existing laws by private persons, are certainly contracts of civil 
institution."); Mayor, Aldermen, and Inhabitants of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. 662, 735-36 
(1836) ("It is well known that the policy of Spain in regard to a disposition of her public 
domain, is entirely different to that which has been adopted by the United States. We dispose of 
our public lands by sale; but Spain has uniformly bestowed her domain in reward for meritorious 
services, or to encourage some enterprise deemed of public utility."); Long v. 0 'Fallon, 60 U.S. 
116, 125 (1856) ("The land was then a part of the public domain, and subject to entry at the 
land office, under the laws of the United States."); Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875) 
("The act of [March 3, 1851] declared that all lands, the claims to which should not have been 
presented within two years therefrom, should 'be deemed, held, and considered to be a part of the 
public domain of the United States."'); Wash. & Idaho R.R. Co. v. Osborn , 160 U.S. 103, 108 
(1895) ("[T]he trial court found that the land claimed by Osborn was a part of the unsurveyed 
public domain of the United States."). 
1 55 In two other intellectual property cases before 1896, the phrase was used to refer to 
lands owned by the government. Marsh v. Nichols, Shepherd & Co. ,  128 U.S. 605, 610 (1888) 
(analogizing to patent patents for invention "[w]ith respect to patents for land we have had 
frequent occasion to assert their inviolability against collateral attack, where . . .  the land formed 
part of the public domain, and the law provided for their sale."); La Repub/ique Francaise v. 
Schultz, 57 F. 37, 38 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("[T]he crown of France became the owner of said 
mineral springs, and remained such until 1790, when said springs were united to the public 
domain of the state of France."), dismissed, 94 F. 500 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F. 153 
(2d Cir. 1900); see also La Repub/ique Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. ,  99 F. 733 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1900), rev 'd, 107 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1901), aff'd, sub nom . French Republic v. 
Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. , 191 U.S. 427,434 (1903) (finding that mineral springs were "the 
property of the crown . . . until 1790, when they were united to the public domain and 
afterwards passed to the French Republic and its successors . . .  "). 
1 56 29 F. Cas. 905 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873). 
157 [d. at 908. 
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that that patent did not include the devices embraced in the other 
reissues upon which this suit is brought.158 
And in Brush Electric Co. v. Electrical Accumulator Co. /59 the court 
remarked: 
It is said the expiration of the Italian patent threw the invention into 
the public domain. So it did, into the domain of the Italian public, but 
if Mr. Brush had taken no patent in Italy the Italian public could 
have practiced the invention from the moment it became known 
there. 1 60 
On May 18, 1896, the Supreme Court used the phrase "public domain" 
for the fIrst time in an intellectual property case.161 The case, Singer 
Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing CO. ,162 involved the use of the 
name "Singer" to refer to sewing machines. The Court fIrst held that the 
word "Singer" had become generic for sewing machinesl63 (much as the 
word "hoover" has become generic for vacuum cleaners in the United 
Kingdom,l64 but not in the U.S. 165). The Court then explained the public 
policy behind its ruling: 
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly 
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing 
158 [d. at 909. 
1 59 47 F. 48 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891). 
160 [d. at 56. The court nonetheless issued an injunction, based on the finding that "the 
more the Italian patent is studied the more settled becomes the conviction that it is not for the 
same invention . . .  " [d. at 55. 
161 Not counting a patent case eight years before in which they had used the phrase to refer 
to government lands. Marsh , 128 U.S. at 610. 
1 62 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
163 [d. at 180-83. It should be noted that it has more recently been held that Singer "has by 
the constant and exclusive use of the name 'Singer' in designating sewing machines and other 
articles manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously and widelyL] 
recaptured from the public domain the name 'Singer."'. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 
n. 3 (5th Cir. 1953) (Finding of Fact No. 4); see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Upholstering & 
Sewing Co., 130 F. Supp. 205, 208 (W.O. Pa. 1955) (''' Singer' and a letter 'S' are good and 
valid trade-marks and trade-names for sewing machines, furniture, sewing supplies and services .. 
. and are the exclusive property of plaintiff, The Singer Manufacturing Company."); see 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. ,  386 U.S. 714, 716-17, n. 5 (1967) 
(disapproved on other grounds). 
164 Oxford English Dictionary 374 (2d ed., Oxford University Press 1989); Hoover Co. v. 
Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd. , 674 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "an English 
dictionary defines a 'hoover' as a vacuum cleaner "). 
165 Hoover, 674 F. Supp. at 461 ("Plaintiff began using the Hoover name in 1908 and holds 
trademark registrations for the name on vacuum cleaners and other floor care products and 
home appliances."). 
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fonnerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon 
this condition that the patent is granted . . . .  It equally follows from 
the cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented device 
into the domain of things public, that along with the public 
ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the 
public the generic designation of the thing which has arisen during 
the monopoly. 1 66 
241 
The Court supported its decision in part by quoting (in English 
translation) from three French treatisesl 67 and two French cases,1 68 each of 
which used the tenn ''the public domain." Finally, having become 
accustomed to the French use of the phrase, the Court used the phrase itself 
in summing up. 1 69 
1 66 Singer, 163 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 186 ("Abandonment in industrial property is an act by which the public domain 
originally enters or reenters into the possession of the thing (commercial name, mark or sign,) 
by the will of the legitimate owner.") (quoting De Maragy, International Dictionary of Industrial 
Property); id. at 196 ("But at the expiration of the patent does the designation fall into the 
public domain with the patented invention?") (quoting Braun, Marques des Fabrique 
[Trademarks] § 68, at 232); id. at 198 ("That when an invention falls into the public domain, it 
enters with the name which the inventor has given it, and he cannot prevent a person from 
employing this designation ... ") (quoting Pouillet, Brevets D 'Invention [Patents] § 328, at 279). 
1 68 Id. at 199 ("[T]he methods of manufacture of a patented product fall into the public 
domain after the expiration of the patent, but it is otherwise as to the name of the inventor . . .  
except in the case where, either by long usage or in consequence of a consent either expressly or 
tacitly given by the inventor, his surname having become the sole usual designation of his 
invention.") (quoting a Court of Cassation decision reported in the Dictionary of De Maragy, 
vol. I ,  at I I ); id. ("whereas, they ... did not take patents in France for the invention and their 
improvements, which have therefore fallen into the public domain . . . ") (quoting another 
French decision reported in the Dictionary of De Maragy). 
1 69 Id. at 202 ("On the machines made by the !inger Company there was a tension screw. 
This screw on the Singer machines served a useful mechanical purpose, and did not pass into the 
public domain with the expiration of the fundamental patents, because specially covered by a 
subsisting patent."); id. at 203 ("Clearly, as the word 'Singer' was dedicated to the public, it could 
not be taken by the Singer Company out of the public domain by the mere fact of using that 
name as one of the constituent elements of a trade -mark. "). 
It should be noted that desp ite its holding that the word "Singer" was generic, the Court 
enjoined the defendants "from using the word 'Singer' or any equivalent thereto, in 
advertisements in relation to sewing machines, without clearly and unmistakably stating in all 
said advertisements that the machines are made by the defendant, as distinguished from the 
sewing machines made by the Singer Manufacturing Company." Id. at 204 (emphasis omitted). 
Thus, in allowing the defendant to use the word "Singer," the court treated it more as a 
descriptive word than a generic one, similar to the current defense for descriptive fair use. See 15 
U.S.C. § I 115(b)(4) (permitting "a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which 
is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such 
party"). This interpretation also explains how the word "Singer" could be recaptured from the 
public domain, since the Lanham Act permits the registration of a descriptive word, which has 
acquired secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(t). 
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In adopting the phrase "public domain" from French law, the Supreme 
Court used the phrase interchangeably with the phrase "public property."1 70 
Some of the French sources that it quoted likewise used the two phrases 
interchangeably. 1 7 1  In addition, the Court quoted an English case that used 
the phrase ''publici juris" to describe an invention on which the patent had 
expired. 1 72 This indicates that the Court intended and believed that the 
phrase "public domain" had the same meaning and legal effect as the 
phrases "public property" and ''publici juris." 
Despite the Supreme Court's imprimatur, the phrase "public domain" 
was slow to catch on. It was used only four times during the next decade. 1 73 
Instead, courts continued to use the phrases "public property," 1 74 "common 
1 70 Singer, 163 U.S. at 185 (stating that "on the expiration of a patent[,] . . .  the right to 
make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property . . . .  It equally follows 
from the cessation of the monopoly and the fulling of the patented device into the domain of 
things public . . .  "); id. at 191 ("[A]t the expiration of that copyright, such writings or works 
shall go to the public and become public property.") (quoting Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co. , 43 
F. 450, 451 (E.D. Mo. 1890)}; id. at 203 ("But the word 'Singer, ' as we have seen, had become 
public property, and the defendant had a right to use it. . . .  [I]t could not be taken by the Singer 
Company out of the public domain . . . "); see supra nn. 156-58 (discussing Wheeler, 29 F. Cas. at 
908-09). 
1 7 1  Singer, 163 U.S. at 196-97 (quoting Braun, Marques des Fabrique [Trademarks] § 68, 
at 232); id. at 198 ("We know, however, that when the name of the inventor has become the 
designation of the thing patented, it belongs to every one, at the expiration of the patent . . .  ") 
(quoting Pouillet, Brevets d'Invention [Patents] § 329, at 280). 
1 72 Id. at 194 ("It is clear that on the expiration of this patent it was open to all the world 
to manufacture the article which had been patented; that is the consideration which the inventor 
gives for the patent; the invention becomes then entirely publici juris . . . .  It is impossible to 
allow a man to prolong his monopoly by trying to tum a description of the article into a trade­
mark. Whatever is mere description is open to all the world.") (quoting Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch. 
Div. 850, 863 (Eng. 1877)}. 
1 73 See Centaur Co. v. Hughes Bros. Mfg. Co. , 91 F. 901, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1898) (Pardee, 
J., dissenting) ("[T]he word ' Castoria' . . .  did pass into the public domain on the expiration of 
the patent."); Rahtjen 's Am. Composition Co. v. Holzappel 's Composition Co. , 101  F. 257, 261 
(2d Cir. 1900) (quoting and distinguishing Singer), rev'd, 183 U.S. 1 (1901); Kipling v. G.P. 
Putnam 's Sons, 120 F. 631,  634 (2d Cir. 1903) ("This new copyright protected only what was 
original in [that] edition. It did not operate to extend or enlarge prior copyrights or remove 
from the public domain the author's works which, by his own act, he had dedicated to the 
public."); Warren Featherbone Co. v. Am. Featherbone Co. , 141 F. 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1905) 
("Under these circumstances the question occurs whether the name of a patented article at the 
expiration of the patent falls into the public domain with the patented article. We consider this 
question to be no longer an open one."). Kipling is thus the first use of the phrase in a copyright 
case; the other three cases, like Singer, involved the name of a product covered by an expired 
utility patent. 
1 74 See e.g. G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co. ,  237 U.S. 618, 622 (1915) ("After 
the expiration of a copyright of that character, it is well-settled that the further use of the 
name, by which the publication was known and sold under the copyright, cannot be acquired by 
registration as a trade-mark; for the name has become public property, and is not subject to such 
appropriation."); MifJ1in v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265, 266 (1903) ("As the first twenty-nine 
chapters of 'The Minister's Wooing ' appeared in the Atlantic Monthly before any steps 
whatever were taken . . .  to obtain a copyright, it follows that they, at least, became public 
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property,"1 75 or "publici juris ." 176 The use of the phrase "public domain" in 
the 1 909 Copyright Act' 77 and by the Supreme Court in 191 1 1 78 helped 
encourage its adoption;1 79 but it is Learned Hand who deserves much of the 
credit for making the phrase popular. He used it in twelve published cases 
between 1 9 15 and 1924,1 80 nearly twice as many times as all other judges 
property."); Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen 's Am. Composition Co. , 183 U.S. 1, 10 
(1901) ("[W]hen the patent expired the exclusive right to manufacture the article expired with 
it . . .  [the name of the article] thus became public property descriptive of the article, and the 
right to manufacture it was open to all by the expiration of the English patent."); Ogilvie v. G. 
& c. Merriam Co. ,  149 F. 858, 860 (D. Mass. 1907) ("A copyright . . .  is granted upon the 
implied condition that at the expiration of the copyright the book and the name by which it is 
designated are dedicated to the public; in other words, at the expiration of the copyright, both 
the book and its generic name become public property."); cf Centaur Co. v. Heinsfurter, 84 F. 
955, 959 (8th Cir. 1898) ("[T]he word 'Castoria,' being the generic name by which the article is 
known to the public, has become the property of the public, and any one is at liberty to use it as 
descriptive of the thing he is manufacturing and selling. "). 
1 75 See e.g. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907) ('''It is a 
fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination of the work of 
art itself among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of 
rendering such work common property."') (quoting Slater on the Law of Copyright and 
Trademark 92); Holmes, 174 U.S. at 86 ("The right thus secured by the copyright act is not a 
right to the use of certain words, because they are the common property of the human race."); 
Centaur, 84 F.  at 957 ("It matters not that the inventor coined the word by which the thing has 
become known. It is enough that the public has accepted that word as the name of the thing, for 
thereby the word has become incorporated as a noun into the English language, and the common 
property of all."). 
1 76 See e.g. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 431 (1912) ("Hence, it is said, the play not 
being copyrighted in the United States was publici juris here, and the adapter was entitled to use 
it as common material."); G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Straus, 136 F. 477, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1904) 
("[T]he bill is in part an attempt to protect the literary property in the dictionaries which 
became publici juris upon the expiration of the copyrights.") (emphasis added). 
1 77 See supra nn. 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the phrase "public 
domain" in the 1909 Copyright Act); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co.,  176 F. 833, 837 
(2d Cir. 1910); Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co. , 192 F. 899,900 (2d Cir. 1912); DuPuy v. 
Post Telegram Co. , 210 F. 883, 884 (3d Cir. 1914). 
1 78 See Baglin v. Cusenier Co. , 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (De Maragy's definition of 
abandonment, as quoted in Singer, supra note 167). 
1 79 See A.D. Howe Mach. Co. v. Coffield Motor Washer Co. ,  197 F. 541, 547 (4th Cir. 
1912) ("If, as often happens, Coffield has been so unfortunate as not to secure legal protection 
for his inventive idea, and as a consequence it became a part of the public domain, he and 
complainant must stand their loss."); Union Spec. Mach. Co. v. Maimin , 18S F. 120, 132 (E.D. 
Pa. 1911) ("The fact that machines not embodying the combination, as a whole, had fallen into 
the public domain through the expiration of a prior patent, conferred no right upon the seller to 
utilize those parts to form the new combination"); id. at 133 ("The machines not embodying 
the combination in suit, as a whole, have fallen into the public domain and gone into common 
use.") (report of special master); Richard Rodgers Bowker, Copyright, Its History and Its Law 
127 (The Riverside Press 1912) ("[I]t is at least doubtful whether a book puulished in another 
country prior to publication here, unless protected by international copyright relations, has not 
fallen into the public domain and t!lUS forfeited copyright protection here."). 
180 See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. ,  250 F. 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1918); 
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co. , 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); Strause Gas Iron 
Co. v. William M. Crane Co. , 235 F. 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1916); Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 
230 F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916) (quoting Learned Hand's district court opinion); Fred Fisher, 
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combined. 1 81 Particularly influential was his 1930 oplIllon in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp. ,182 in which the Second Circuit held that general 
plot ideas are part of the public domain, even if original to the plaintiffl 83 
Hand was also responsible for the alternative spelling of "public 
demesne." "Demesne" is a Norman French spelling of the word "domain," 
used principally to refer to lands held by the Crown. 1 84 It was already 
archaic in the 1920s, having been used only once in federal case law, a 
century before.1 85 Hand first used the variant to refer to intellectual property 
in 1920;1 86 and with a handful of exceptions (notably Nichols),187 he used it 
exclusively after 1924. 188 The alternative spelling never caught on; it was 
Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 148-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alexander 
Milburn Co. , 297 F. 846, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Jeweler 's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. 
Co. , 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. , 272 F. 505, 512 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921); Stodart v. Mutual Film Corp., 249 F. 507, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Page 
Mach. Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co. , 238 F. 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743, 
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Herbert v. Shanley Co. , 222 F. 344, 345 (S. D.N.Y. 1915). 
1 81 . See McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp. , 299 F. 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1924); Am. Code Co., Inc. v. 
Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1922); Inti. Film Servo Co., Inc. v. Affiliated Distributors, 
Inc., 283 F. 229, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. V. White, 259 F. 364, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 1919); G. Ricordi & Co., Inc. V. Columbia Graphophone Co. , 256 F. 699, 703 
(S.D.N.Y. 1919); One-Piece Bifocal Lens CO. V. Bisight Co. , 246 F. 450, 457 (D. Md. 1917); 
Brady V. Reliance Motion Picture Corp. , 232 F. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
1 82 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
1 83 Id. at 122 ("We assume that the plaintiffs play is altogether original, even to an extent 
that in fact it is hard to believe. We assume further that, so far as it has been anticipated by 
earlier plays of which she knew nothing, that fact is immaterial. Still, as we have already said, 
her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its content went to 
some extent into the public domain. "). 
1 84 Compare Oxford English Dictionary vol. 4, 436 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d 
ed., Clarendon Press 1989); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (Philip Babcock 
Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 1993) ("demesne"); with Oxford English Dictionary at vol. 7, 942; 
Webster's Third Nw International Dictionary at 670 ("domain"). Modem French uses the 
spelling "domaine." 
1 85 See Doe, ex demo Governeur's Heirs V. Robertson, 24 U.S. 332, 343 (1826) (Mr. 
Sampson, for the plaintiff) ("The title of the public demesne lands in England is vested in the 
crown; the king has, by the constitution, the sole power of granting them. "). 
1 86 See Vapor Car Heating Co., Inc. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Co. , 296 F. 188, 195 
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) ("It all proceeds upon the doctrine, thoroughly well settled, that, when an 
applicant receives his patent, the monopolies or 'inventions' are embodied in his claims, and the 
disclosure in all its parts he transfers over into the public demesne. "). 
1 87 See supra n. 183; Am.-Marietta CO. V. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1960); see 
also Natl. Comics Publication V. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 598-99, 603 (2d Cir. 
1951); Musher Found. V. Alba Trading Co. , 150 F.2d 885, 888 (2d Cir. 1945). 
1 88 See Capital Records V. Mercury Records Corp. , 221 F.2d 657, 668 (2d Cir. 1955) (L. 
Hand, J., dissenting); Conmar Prods. Corp. V. Universal Slide Fastener Co. , 172 F.2d 150, 155 
(2d Cir. 1949); Engr. Dev. Laboratories V. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523, 526 (2d Cir. 
1946); w. States Mach. Corp. v. s.s. Hepworth Co. , 147 F.2d 345, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1945); G.H. 
Mumm Champagne V. E. Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1944); Picard V. United 
Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1942); Fashion Originators Guild of Am. V. F. Trade 
Commn. , 114 F.2d 80, 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Sheldon V. Metro Goldwyn Pictures Corp. , 81 F.2d 
49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936), on appeal after remand, 106 F.2d 45, 50 (1939), af!'d, 309 U.S. 390, 
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used in only a handful of opinions not written by Hand, 189 and its last original 
use (other than quotations from earlier opinions) was in 1 955. 190 
Between 1924 and 1944, the courts of appeals used the phrase "public 
domain" 191 (or "public demesne"I92) in 52 intellectual property cases/93 
compared with 24 uses of "public property," 194 2 1  uses of "common 
property,,, 195 and 23 uses of 'Publici juri's.,, 196 The Supreme Court used 
392 (1940) (quoting Hand 's 1939 opinion); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co. ,  67 
F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1933); Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823, 830, 
832 (2d Cir. 1928); Grasselli Chern. ·Co. v. Natl. Aniline & Chern. Co., 26 F.2d 305, 308, 310 
(2d Cir. 1928); Traitel Marble Co. v. U.T. Hungerford Brass & Copper Co. ,  22 F.2d 259, 261 
(2d Cir. 1927). Hand is probably also responsible for the per curiam opinion in Barry v. Hughes, 
103 F.2d 427,427 (2d Cir. 1939). 
189 See e.g. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. , 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 
1951) (Swan, J.) ("When the copyright expired, the play was property in the public demesne, 
since the record discloses no renewal of the copyright."); id. at 472 (clarifying that only "the 
copyrightable new matter in the play was property in the public demesne," since the play was a 
derivative work of a novel that was still protected by copyright). 
190 See E-I-M Co. v. Phi/a. Gear Works, 223 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1955) ("its presently 
accused structure stems from the prior art Jones patent, now in the public demesne . . .  "). 
1 91 See e.g. Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co. , 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944) ("The information as 
to the continental outlines appearing on the map and as to the latitude and longitude of the 
cities located thereon was taken from maps, atlases and other publications on file in the 
Department [of the Interior], and such information was in the public domain."); Arnstein v. 
Broad. Music, Inc. , 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943) (noting "the vast amount of music in the 
public domain"); Becker v. Loew 's, Inc. , 133 F.2d 889,892 (7th Cir. 1943) ("[A]ny similarity is 
so abstract that the theme is common property and remains in the public domain with the result 
that no copyright protects it."). 
192 See supra nn. 184-190 and accompanying text. 
193 The methodology was to search for the specified phrase in the Westlaw ALLFEDS-OLD 
database, limited to those cases identified by key numbers as copyright, patent, and trademark 
cases (99k! 291K! 382k !). 
194 See e.g. Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1944) ("The discoverer's 
property right in a trade secret ceases prospectively to exist . . .  once the matter has become 
public property by a general disclosure on the part of the discoverer, or by a legitimate discovery 
and rightful general disclosure on the part of another."); Affiliated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 
958, 961 (1 st Cir. 1936) ("However good and valuable an idea, plan, scheme, or system is, the 
moment it is disclosed to the public without the protection of a patent, it becomes public 
property. "). 
195 See e.g. Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Af iliated Enters. , 123 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 
1941) ("When a patent expires, the creative idea does not cease to have value; it simply 
becomes the common property of all."); Leuddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co. , 70 F.2d 345, 349 
(8th Cir. 1934) ("When plaintiff voluntarily divulged his mere idea and suggestion, whatever 
interest he had in it became common property, and, as such, was available to the defendants."). 
This count does not include uses of "common property" to refer to something other than 
material in the public domain, such as joint ownership of a patent or shared physical properties 
of chemical compositions. 
196 See e.g. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co. , 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) 
("[W]hat is the test by which a decision is to be arrived at whether a word which was originally a 
trade mark has become publici juris?") (emphasis added); Phillips v. The Gov. & Co., 79 F.2d 
971, 973 (9th Cir. 1935) ("Descriptive terms and generic names are publici juris and not 
capable of exclusive appropriation by any one, but may be used by all the world in an honestly 
descriptive and nondeceptive manner.") (emphasis added). 
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"public domain" only three times,1 97 most notably in Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit CO.,198 in · which the Court quoted and reaffIrmed 
Singer. 199 During the same period, however, the Supreme Court began to 
abandon the phrase "public property"; its last original use of the phrase was 
in 1926,200 and it has used it only eight times since, in quotes or paraphrases 
of 1 9th Century cases.201 It stopped using the phrases "common property" 
and ''publici juris" altogether.202 The Court used the phrase "public 
domain" three more times in 1945,203 but not again for another fIfteen 
years. 204 
Between 1945 and the present, federal courts decided 2097 intellectual 
property cases in which one or more of these terms was used.205 Of these, 
only 104 (5 percent) used the term "public property"; 93 (4.4 percent) used 
the term "common property"; and just 34 (1 .6 percent) used the term 
''publici juris." One thousand sixty three cases, or 93.6 percent, used the 
term "public domain." Semantically speaking, the triumph of the public 
domain is complete. 
1 97 See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943); Cuno 
Engr. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. , 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); Kellogg Co. v. Natl. Biscuit 
Co. , 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938). 
1 98 305 U .S . at 114 ("[The District Court] held that upon the expiration of the Perky 
patent . . .  the name of the patented article passed into the public domain. "). I" . . Id. at 118, 120; see Pollack, supra n. 4, at 295-98. 
200 See Alexander Millburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co. , 270 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1926) 
("[I]f Whitford had not applied for his patent until after the issue to Clifford, the disclosure by 
the latter would have had the same effect as the publication of the same words in a periodical, 
although not made the basis of a claim. The invention is made public property as much in the 
one case as in the other.") (internal citation omitted). 
201 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 246 n. 9 (1990); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc. , 489 U.S .  141, 152 (1989); Graham v. John Deere Co. ,  383 U.S. 1, 31 n. 17 
(1966); Brulotte v. Thys Co. , 379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964); Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Products Co. , 339 U.S. 605, 618 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Natl. Nut Co., 310 
U.S. 281, 289-90 (1940); Kellogg, 305 U.S . at 120. 
202 The Court 's only subsequent uses of either phrase were in Feist Publications, 499 U .S . at 
352 (quoting Jewelers ' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. ,  281 F. 83, 88 (2d 
Cir. 1922» ; id. at 354 (quoting Inti. News Serv. , 248 U.s. 215); and Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters. , 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting Inti. News Serv. , 248 U.S. 215). 
203 See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. ,  326 U.S. 249, 261, 263 (1945); Special 
Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (Douglas, Black, & Murphy, JJ., dissenting); Hartford­
Empire Co. v. U.S. , 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945). 
204 For a discussion of Supreme Court cases after 1960, see infra nn. 205-266 and 
accompanying text. 
205 These statistics are based on a search of the Westlaw ALLFEDS database on September 
16, 2002, limited to those cases identified by key numbers as copyright, patent, and trademark 
cases (99k! 291k! 382k!). 
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
In the 1 960s, the Supreme Court decided several patent cases that 
placed renewed emphasis on the Constitutional lnsis of U.S. patent law, and 
on the limits imposed by the Patent and Copyright Clause. 
First, in a pair of 1964 decisions known collectively as Sears/Compco,z°6 
the Court held that the States could not prohibit the copying of matter, which 
the patent laws Ie ft in the public domain. The Court in Sears reaffirmed that 
"when [a] patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the 
right to make the article? including the right to make it in precisely the 
shape it carried when patented? passes to the public.,,201 It also held that 
"[a]n unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is 
in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do 
SO."208 The Court then explained that "[t]o allow a State by use of its law of 
unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too 
slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off 
from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the 
public.,,209 
In Compco, the Court summarized its holding in Sears as follows: 
Today we have held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co . . . . 
that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state 
law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying 
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of 
the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing 
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws 
leave in the public domain. Here Day-Brite's fixture has been hell 
not to be entitled to a design or mechanical patent. Under the 
federal patent laws it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be 
copied in every detail by whoever pleases.2 IO  
206 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. StifJel Co. , 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day­
Brite Lighting, Inc. , 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
201 376 U.S. at 230 (citing Keilogg, 305 U.S. at 120-22; Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185). See 
supra nn. 162-172, 198-199 and accompanying text. 
208 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 . 
209 Id. at 231-32 ("Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an 
article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents. To do either would run 
counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true inventions, and then only for 
a limited time. "). 
2 10 376 U.S. at 237-38. 
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According to Compco, therefore, the Constitution itself expresses a 
policy of "allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and 
copyright laws leave in the public domain." 
Two years later, in Graham v. John Deere Co. / 1 1  the Court again 
discussed the relationship between the Constitution and the public domain: 
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power 
stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the 
Congress "To promote the Progress of . . .  useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power 
and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often 
exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English 
Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts." 
It was written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually 
curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting 
monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long 
before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the exercise of 
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional pwpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent 
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social 
benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to 
materials already available . . . .  This is the standard expressed in 
the Constitution and it may not be ignored. 212 
After reviewing the views of Thomas Jefferson, the Court added: 
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his 
natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an 
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an 
exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds 
with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be 
freely given. Only inventions and discoveries, which furthered 
human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special 
inducement of a limited private monopoly. 213 
2 1 1 3 8 3  U.S. 1 (1966). 212 /d. at 5-6 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
2 1 3 Id. at 9. 
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Thus, the Court in Graham concluded that a patent had to be both new 
(i.e., novel) and useful to meet the Constitutional standard. 
In two other decisions, the Court made it clear that the federal policy 
permitting free copying of any article in the public domain preempted 
contractual provisions to the contrary. In Brulotte v. Thys CO.,214 the Court 
held that a contract in which a licensee promised to pay royalties for the use 
of a patented machine was unenforceable after the patent had expired. It 
said: "[t]he right to make, the right to sell, and the right to use 'may be 
granted or conferred separately by the patentee.' But these rights become 
public property once the 17-year period expires.,,215 And in Lear v. Adkins 
Co. ,21 6  the court held that a patent licensee could not be estopped from 
challenging the validity of a patent. The Court said: "enforcing this 
contractual provision woul<i undermine the strong federal policy favoring the 
full and free use of ideas in the public domain."217 
In the 1970s, the Court decided three cases that are viewed collectively 
as having cut back on the scope of preemption of state law. Two of the 
cases, however, are consistent with the view that the Constitution requires 
free copying of articles in the public domain. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp. ,218 the Court held that state trade secret law was not preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause. The Court acknowledged that under 
Sears/Compco, ''that which is in the public domain cannot be removed 
therefrom by action of the States,"219 but it concluded that: 
[T]he policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in 
the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade 
secret protection. By defmition a trade secret has not been placed in 
the public domain. 220 
214 379 u.s. 29 (1964). 
215 [d. at 31 (footnotes omitted) (citing Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185 and Kellogg, 305 U.S. 
at 118); see also Brulotte, 379 U.S.  at 33 ("The exaction of royalties for use of a machine after 
the patent has expired is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when, as 
we have seen, the patent has entered the public domain."). 
216 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
217 [d. at 670; see also id. at 674 ("Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very 
heavily when they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free 
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain."). 
21 8 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
219 [d. at 481. 
220 [d. at 484 (footnote omitted); see also Graham , 383 U.S. at 9 ("The grant of an 
exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free 
nature of disclosed ideas.") (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co . ,m the Court upheld a 
contract for the disclosure of an unpublished patent application that required 
payment of a 5 percent royalty in the event a patent issued, and payment of 
a 2'l'2 percent royalty in the event no patent issued. 222 The Court said: 
Quick Point argues that enforcement of such contracts conflicts 
with the federal policy against withdrawing ideas from the public 
domain . . . . We fmd no merit in this contention. Enforcement of 
the agreement does not withdraw any idea from the public domain. 
The design for the keyholder was not in the public domain before 
Quick Point obtained its license to manufacture it. 223 
The Court also relied on the fact that the parties had expressly 
contemplated the possibility that a patent might not issue and had adjusted 
the royalty accordingly. 224 
The third case, Goldstein v. California ,225 involved a California 
criminal statute prohibiting "record piracy," i.e., ''the unauthorized 
duplication of recordings of perfonnances by major musical artists."226 
Drawing an analogy to the donnant Commerce Clause,227 the defendants 
argued that the Copyright Clause preempted the state law. The Court 
rejected this argument, holding that the States remained free to adopt 
intellectual property laws that did not conflict with federal law.228 In 
response to the argument that Congress had occupied the entire field, the 
Court held 5-4 that "[i]n regard to this category of 'Writings,' Congress has 
drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no reason 
exists why the State should not be free to act."229 The Court also indicated 
that a state-law copyright of unlirnited duration did not violate the Copyright 
221 440 U.S. 257 ( 1 979). 
222 Id. at 266. 
223 Id. at 263 (citations omitted). 
224 Id. at 26 1 -62. 
225 4 1 2  U.S. 546 ( 1 973). 
226 Id. at 549. 
227 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S.  299, 3 1 9  ( 1 852) ("Whatever subjects of this 
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, 
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."). 
228 Goldstein , 4 1 2  U.S. at 552-60; but see id. at 572-75 (Douglas, Brennan, & Blackmun, 
JJ., dissenting) (indicating federal policy of encouraging free competition in unpatented and 
uncopyrighted articles requires national uniformity). 
229 Id. at 570; but see id. at 576-79 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) 
(federal policy of encouraging free competition in unpatented and uncopyrighted articles requires 
that Congressional silence "be taken to reflect a judgment that free competition should 
prevail"). 
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 251 2002-2003
2003] THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 25 1 
Clause, saying, ''whatever limitations have been appended to such powers 
can only be understood as a limit on congressional, and not state, action.'mo 
Goldstein has been criticized on the ground that it is inconsistent with 
the principle that the Constitution requires free copying of material in the 
public domain.23 I In addition, in the 1 976 Act Congress overturned 
Goldstein prospectively by preempting all state causes of action 
"equivalent" to copyright.232 In so doing, Congress specifically indicated that 
states could not protect matter that was unprotected by copyright. 233 While 
the 1 976 Act expressly permitted state protection of sound recordings fixed 
before February 1 5, 1 972, it imposed a limit on the duration of such 
protection.234 Thus, Goldstein may be considered an example of the adage 
that "hard cases make bad la w. ,,235 
In the next decade, the Court said little about the public domain. In Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,236 the Court discussed 
the Patent and Copyright Clause237 and noted that one of the purposes of 
copyright is to place material into the public domain, 238 but its view of the 
230 Id. at 560. The Court was not asked to address the possibility that a state copyright of 
unlimited duration would violate the First Amendment. Cf Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright 
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?,  1 7  UCLA L. Rev. 1 1 80, 
1 1 93-94 ( 1 970). 
23 I See e.g. Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the 
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of 
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. , 1 8  Seattle U. L .  Rev. 259, 305-20 ( 1 995) ("[T]he Court 's  
assertion that records were 'of purely local importance' failed the giggle test."). 
232 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a). 
233 See supra nn. 93-94 and accompanying text. 
. 
234 1 7  U.S.C. § 301 (c). February 1 5, 1972 was the date that the 1909 Copyright Act was 
amended to give federal copyright protection to sound recordings. Id. 
235 See Pollack, supra n. 2 3 1 ,  at 304 ("To be even more precise, the case exemplifies the 
two-sided focus of the adversary system allowing black-hat/whit!>-hat rhetoric to distract the 
Court from public domain values."); id. at 306-09 (noting that the briefs and argument failed to 
adequately present the issue of dormant Copyright Clause preemption). 
236 464 U.S.  4 1 7  ( 1984). 
237 Id. at 43 1 -32 ("The limited scope of the copyright holder'S statutory monopoly, like 
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for 
an 'author' s' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good."). 
238 Id. at 429 ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is 
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired.") (emphasis added); see Sun trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. , 268 F.3d 1 257, 1 26 1 -
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public domain was decidedly idiosyncratic.239 In three decisions between 
1977 and 1 987, however, the Court rejected a First Amendment defense to 
various types of intellectual property law. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. ,240 the Court held 5-4 that the First Amendment did not 
give a news station the right to .broadcast a videotape of the plaintiff's 
human cannonball act.24 1 In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises,242 the Court held 6-3 that the First Amendment did not protect 
a magazine that published excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs in advance 
of the authorized publication date.243 The Court stated that First Amendment 
values were already adequately reflected in various substantive limitations 
on copyright law, including the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine.244 And in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States 
62 ( 1 1th Cir. 200 1 )  (identifying "protection of the public domain" as one of the purposes of the 
Copyright Clause). 
239 The majority opinion included within the public domain privileged uses of otherwise 
copyrighted material. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 ("All reproductions of the work, however, are not 
within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any 
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner does not 
possess the exclusive right to such a use."). Some scholars agree with this characterization. See 
e.g. Benkler, supra n. 4, at 358 n. 16  ("As will become clear, I use the term 'public domain' in an 
atypically broad sense. The term more commonly denotes information or works that are not 
protected. It does not usually refer to privileged uses of protected information."). Another 
scholar places fair use "outside the public domain in theory, but seemingly inside in effect." 
Samuelson, supra n. 13 ,  at 3. 
240 433 U.S. 562 ( 1 977). 
241 [d. at 569-79. The intellectual property right at issue was Ohio's right of publicity law. 
[d. at 565, 569. It has been suggested, however, that the case is better analyzed as a state 
common-law copyright in an unpublished (indeed, unfixed) work of authorship. [d. at 564 
(describing majority opinion in Ohio Court of Appeals); id. at 573, 575 (drawing an analogy to 
copyright law). "Publication" is defined in the Copyright Act to mean the distribution of 
tangible copies of the work; it does not include the public performance or public display of the 
work. 17  U.S.C. § 101 .  In addition, the Court relied on Goldstein , a case involving a state-law 
copyright. 433 U.S.  at 577 n. 1 3 .  
242 47 1 U.S. 539. 
243 [d. at 5 55-60. It should be noted that because the Ford manuscript had not yet been 
published, protecting it against unauthorized disclosure was analogous to protecting a trade 
secret. See id. at 552-55 (scope of fair use in an unpublished manuscript is less than in a 
published manuscript). In fact, The Nation knowingly copied the excerpts from a stolen copy of 
the manuscript. /d. at 543, 563; but see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 5 1 4, 534 (200 1 )  (holding 
that publication of illegally intercepted cell phone conversation, where · publisher did not 
participate in the interception but had reason to know it was unlawful, was protected by the First 
Amendment where the subject matter of the phone call was a matter of public concern); New 
York Times Co. v. U.s. ,  403 U.S. 7 1 3 ,  7 1 4  ( 1 97 1 )  (per curiam) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects a newspaper's right to publish information of great public concern 
obtained from documents stolen by a third party). 
244 Harper & Row Publishers, 47 1 U.S. at 560; see Nimmer, supra n. 230, at 1 192-93. The 
Court specifically noted that "copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a 
prior author's vork those constituent elements that are not original-for example, quotations 
borrowed under the rubric of fair use from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the 
public domain-as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original 
contributions." /d. at 548. 
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Olympic Commision. ,245 the Court held 7-2 that the First Amendment did 
not restrict Congress' power to grant a statutory trademark in the word 
"Olympic" to the USOC.246 
In 1 989, the Court revived its focus on the Constitutional limits placed on 
patent and copyright law. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc ./47 the Court unanimously held that the Supremacy Clause preempted a 
Florida statute, which prohibited duplication of boat hulls by a "direct 
molding" process.248 In so holding, the Court expressly "reaffirmed" 
Sears/Compco, as modified by Kewanee/49 and suggested that state 
regulation would be improper ''without any showing of consumer confusion, 
or breach of trust or secrecy.,,250 
More fundamentally, the Court in Bonito Boats repeatedly emphasized 
the importance and Constitutional underpinnings of the public domain. It 
stated: 
The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability 
embody a congressional understanding, imp/(cit in the Patent 
Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to 
which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover, 
the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs 
and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.25 1 
The Court quoted Singer for the proposition that "on the expiration of a 
patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the 
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property."252 It 
remarked that "[i]n essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire public from 
245 483 U.s. 522 ( 1 987). 
246 [d. at 5 3 1 -4 1 .  The precise rationale for the decision is unclear; but the Court stressed 
that the statute "applies primarily to commercial speech," and it found no significant harm to 
noncommercial speech in the record. [d. at 536 n. 1 5 .  The Court also noted that "[t]he 
possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious," id. at 539, even though it had ruled that 
the statute did not require proof of confusion. [d. at 529-30. Finally, the Court cited with 
approval a case, which allowed the use of the protected Olympic symbols in a non-misleading 
and non-commercial manner. [d. at 536 n. 1 4  (citing Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.s. Olympic 
Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1 1 12, 1 1 18-21  (S.D.N.Y. 1 980» . Each of these limitations is a 
potentially significant qualification of the majority opinion. 
247 489 U.S. 14 1  ( 1 989) . .  
248 [d. at 1 68. 
249 [d. at 1 5 2-57. It is worth noting that while the Court discussed Kewanee and explained 
why it was consistent with Sears/Compeo in great detail, it relegated Aronson and Goldstein to a 
single paragraph apiece. [d. at 1 56, 1 65 .  
250 [d. at 167 .  
25 1 [d. at 1 5 1  (emphasis added). 
252 [d. at 152 (quoting Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 1 85). See supra nn. 1 62-172 and 
accompanying text. 
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engaging in a fonn of reverse engineering of a product in the public 
domain."253 Finally, it reiterated its statement in Graham that Congress may 
not "authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.,,254 
Two years later, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. ,255 the Court unanimously held that Congress cannot grant 
copyright protection to the telephone white pages. The Court stated that 
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement,"256 and held that "no one may 
claim originality as to facts . . . .  because facts do not owe their origin to an 
act of authorship. ,,257 It explained: 
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first 
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; 
he or she has merely discovered its existence . . . .  The same is 
true of all facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the 
day. "They may not be copyrighted and are part of the public 
domain available to every person.,,258 
The Court also emphasized that the freedom to copy facts is protected 
by the Constitution: 
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor 
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan 
has correctly observed, however, this is not "some unforeseen 
byproduct of a statutory scheme." It ii, rather, "the essence of 
copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective 
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o promote 
253 Id. at 1 60 ("Reverse mgineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public 
domain often leads to significant advances in technology."); see TrajFix Devices. Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays. Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (200 1) .  
254  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.  at  146, (quoting Graham , 383 U.S.  at 6). The Court noted that 
"Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection 
knowledge that is already available to the public. They express a congressional determination 
that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially useful 
purpose, but would . . .  injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use." Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 148; see Pfaffv. Wells Elecs .. Inc. , 525 U.S. 55, 64 ( 1 998) ("[Section] 1 02 of 
the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both excluding ideas that are in the public domain 
from patent protection and confining the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term. "). 
25 5 499 U.S.  340 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
256 Id. at 346. The Court explained that it had defined the Constitutional terms "Authors" 
and "Writings" in such a way as to "presuppose a degree of originality." Id. 
257 Id. at 347. 
25 8 Id. at 347-48, (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios Inc., 650 F.2d 1 3 65, 1 369 (5th 
Cir. 1981» . 
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts" . . . .  To this end . . .  raw 
facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor 
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the 
progress of science and art.m 
255 
In the decade since Feist, the Court mentioned the public domain only in 
passing.260 In January 2003, however, in Eldred v. Ash croft,26 1 the Court 
upheld against Constitutional challenge that portion of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act which extended all subsisting copyrights by 
20 years. The petitioners in Eldred had argued that retroactive extensions 
of copyright do rot "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" 
because such extensions cannot provide an incentive to create works that 
already exist; and that serial extensions of copyright would amount to 
"perpetual copyright on the instalhnent plan,,,262 which would violate the 
"limited Times" requirement of the Patent and Copyright Clause.263 By a 7-2 
majority, the Court rejected both arguments.264 The Court also rejected the 
argument that retroactive extension of copyright violates the First 
Amendment.265 Under the opinion in Eldred, Congress holds virtually 
259 Id. at 349-50 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, 47 1 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at I :28 ("It is 
important to emphasize that there is absolutely nothing legally or morally reprehensible about 
exact copying of things in the public domain."). 
260 See N. Y.  Times Co. v. Tasin� 533 U.S. 483, 494 (200 1)  (Under the 1 909 Copyright Act, 
"when a copyright notice appeared only in the publisher's name, the author'S work would fall 
into the public domain."); id. at 507 n. I (Stevens, Breyer, II., dissenting) ("[F]ailure to 
accompany the article with an individual copyright in the author's name allowed the article to 
pass into the public domain."); Pfaf , 525 U.S.  at 65 ("The patent laws therefore seek both to 
protect the public's right to retain knowledge already in the public domain and the inventor's 
right to control whether and when he may patent his invention."). 
26 1 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 200 1), petition for rehearing and rehearing en 
banc denied sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 200 1), aff'd, 123 S.Ct. 769 
(2003). For an analysis of the opinions below, see Ochoa, supra n. 1 4, at 1 09-24. 
262 See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 Or. L .  Rev. 299, 303 ( 1 996) 
(describing the CTEA as "down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan"). The 
phrase originated in Jaszi's  testimony to Congress in 1995. Sen. Jud. Comm., A Bill to Amend 
the Provisions of Title 17, United States Code, with Respect to the Duration of Copyright, andfor 
Other Purposes: Hearing on Sen. 483, 1 04th Congo 73 (Sept. 20, 1 995) (statement of Peter 
Jaszi) . 
263 See Br. of Petr. at 18-22, Eldred V. Ashcroft, 1 23 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
264 Eldred, 1 23 S.Ct. at 783-87; but see id. at 7 9 1 -93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 807-08 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
265 Id. at 7 88-90 (majority). The essence of the argument was that copyright term 
extension is a content-neutral restriction on speech that requires intermediate scrutiny; that the 
Act did not further any important governmental interest; and that it burdens substantially more 
speech than necessary to address any permissible governmental interest. See Br. of Petro at 33-
47 ,  Eldred V. Ashcroft, 1 23 S .  Ct. 769 (2003); Nimmer, supra n .  230, at 1 1 94-95 (arguing that 
retroactive extension of copyright violates the First Amendment). 
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unlimited power to restrict the flow of new material into the public 
domain. 266 
VI. OWNERSHIP AND PERMANENCE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
A. Who Owns the Public Domain ? 
Many modern definitions of the phrase "the public domain" characterize 
it as material not subject to intellectual property protection. 267 In other words, 
the public domain is marked by the absence of ownership. 268 Copyright 
owners have invoked this image in powerful rhetoric advocating stronger 
intellectual property protection. Consider, for example, the following 
statement of Jack Valenti, of the Motion Picture Association of America: 
A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its 
life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it 
becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who, 
then, will invest the funds to renovate and nourish its future life 
when no one owns it?269 
Such rhetoric is unfortunately reinforced by the commonly used phrase 
"fallen into the public domain."270 It sounds as if the work has fallen into a 
black hole, never to be heard from again. 271 
266 Eldred, 1 23 S.C!. at 800-0 1 (Stevens, I., dissenting) ("Congress may extend existing 
monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the maj ority's analysis."); id. at 801 ("Fairly read, the 
Court has stated that Congress' actions under the CopyrightlPatent Clause are, for all intents and 
purposes, judicially unreviewable."). For analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion, see Ochoa, 
supra n. 1 1 8 .  
267 See supra n. 1 1 .  
268 Cf Natl. Broad. Co. v. Copy. Royalty Trib. ,  848 F.2d 1 289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(referring to "programs that were in the public domain, not owned by the challenged claimant, 
or for that matter anyone else"); Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280 (discussing "the usage we have 
inherited from Grotius and Pufendorf; these natural law philosophers held that the world was 
'common' [only] in the sense that no individual had a right to exclude others-an unowned 
public domain"). 
269 H.R. Subcomm. on Cts. & Intel!. Prop. of the Iud. Comm., Copyright Term, Film 
Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation-Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. J 248, and H.R. J 734, 
104th Congo (Iune 1 ,  1 995). 
270 Like the "public domain" itself, this usage is of French origin. See supra nn. 69-76, 
1 67- 1 7 1  and accompanying text. 
271 See generally Robert A. Baron, Reconstructing the Public Domain: Metaphor as 
Polemic in the Intellectual Property Wars, 30 Bull. V.R.A. (forthcoming 2003) (available at 
Studiolo, Reconstructing the Public Domain <http://www.studiolo.orglIPNRA-TM-StLouis­
PublicDomain.htm> (Oct. 23, 2002». While rigorous empirical data is scant, certainly our 
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As demonstrated above, however, the phrase "public domain" was used 
originally as a synonym for the phrases "public property" and "common 
property.,,272 Both of these earlier phrases evoke a very different rhetorical 
image: that the entire public owns a property interest in the public domain. 273 
That the terms "private property" and "common property" denoted a 
form of "ownership" is supported by contemporary definitions of those 
words and phrases.274 The fIrst edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published 
in 1 89 1 ,  defIned "public property" as ''those things which are publici juris . 
. . and therefore considered . . . owned by 'the public. ",275 "Common" was 
defIned to mean "shared among several; owned by several jointly.,,276 
"Property" was defmed as: 
Rightful dominion over external objects; ownership; the unrestricted 
and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of the substance 
of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude 
every one else from interfering with it. 277 
As so defmed, the adjective "public" or "common" merely removes 
from the defmition of property the "exclusive" nature of the ownership; it 
does not result in an absence of ownership. 278 
The same should be no less true of the public domain. Indeed, the word 
"domain" was defmed as "[t]he complete and absolute ownership of 
land."279 Thus, the phrase "public domain" implies the public has an 
ownership interest in the material in question. 280 
experience with public domain works such as Shakespeare's plays, Beethoven's symphonies, and 
Da Vinci's paintings demonstrates that Valenti ' s  supposition is incorrect. 
272 See supra nn. 1 56- 1 58, 1 70- 176 and accompanying text. 
273 A similar argument is made in Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280-8 1 .  
274 See id. at 267-83 (discussing various definitions of "property" based on interpretations 
of John Locke). 
275 Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 44, at 963 (emphasis added). 
276 Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
277 Id. at 953; see Webster 's Third New International Dictionary 1 8 1 8  (Philip Babcock 
Gove, ed., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971)  (defining property as "something that is or may be owned 
or possessed"); id. at 1 836 (defining publici juris as "belonging to the public; subject to a right of 
the public to enjoy"). 
278 See Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280 ("To Locke, 'common' requires two elements: (i) no 
individual has the right to exclude all others; and (ii) each member of the commonality has a 
claim right to be included in the common-a right not to be excluded."). 
279 Black, supra n. 1 44, at 385; see id. at 3 5 1  (defining demesne as "domain" or "held in 
one's own right"). 
280 See Black's Law Dictionary 1 229 (6th ed., West 1 990) (defining public domain as 
"[p ]ublic ownership status of writings, documents, or publications that are not protected by 
copyrights"); accord, Basic Am., Inc. v. Shati/a , 992 P.2d 1 75 ,  1 92 (Idaho 1 999). In the 
Seventh Edition, however, the "public ownership" part of the definition was dropped. Black's 
Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 1 , at 1 243 (defining the public domain as the "realm of publications, 
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However, the prrase "public domain" also tends to obscure the nature 
of the public's ownership interest in intellectual property. The word 
"domain" (or "demesne") expressly invokes the metaphor of land. Indeed, 
lands owned by the United States Government are frequently referred to as 
the "public domain.,,28I By virtue of the Property Clause of the 
Constitution,282 Congress enjoys virtually absolute discretion in managing the 
public lands of the United States.283 In particular, even though courts often 
characterize the government's ownership of land in the public domain as a 
"public trust," Congress may dispose of those lands in any manner that it 
sees fit,284 and it may alienate those lands to individuals.285 In other words, 
inventions, and processes that are not protected by copyright or patent"). Conspiracy theorists 
may speculate as to the motives of the editors. 
281 See Barker v. Harvey, 1 8 1  U.S. 481 ,  490 ( 1 901)  ("'Public domain' is equivalent to 
'public lands, '  and these words have acquired a settled meaning in the legislation of this country. 
'The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to 
sale or other disposal under general laws."') (quoting Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S.  761 ,  763 
( 1 875» ; Hagen v. Utah, 5 1 0  U.S. 399, 4 1 2  ( 1994) ("The public domain was the land'owned by 
the Government, mostly in the West, that was 'available for sale, entry, and settlement under 
the homestead laws, or other disposition under the general body of land laws. "') (quoting E. 
Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain 6 ( 1 95 1 »; Hagen, 5 1 0  U.S. at 427-28 (Blackmun & 
Souter, JJ., dissenting) ("In its most general application, a public domain is meant to include all 
the land owned by a government-any government, anywhere . . . .  Most commonly, the public 
domain and public lands have been defined as those lands subject to sale or other disposal under 
the general land laws.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also supra n. 1 54 .  
282 U.S. Cons!. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (providing that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States"). 
283 See U.S. v. S.F. , 3 10 U.S.  16 ,  29 ( 1 940) ("The power over the public land thus 
entrusted to Congress is without limitations."); U.s. v. Cal. , 332 U.S. 19, 27 ( 1 947); Kleppe v. 
N.M., 426 U.S. 529, 539 ( 1976); Cal. Coastal Commn. v. Granite Rock Co. , 480 U.S. 572, 580 
( 1 987); Utah Power & Light Co. v .  U.S. , 243 U.S. 389, 404 ( 1 9 1 7) ("[T]he settled course of 
legislation, congressional and state, and repeated decisions of this court have gone upon the 
theory that the power of Congress is exclusive."). 
284 See Light v. U.S. , 220 U.S.  523, 537 ( 1 9 1 1 )  ("All the public lands of the nation are held 
in trust for the people of the whole country . . . .  And it is not for the courts to say how that 
trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine . . . .  These are rights incident to 
proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the 
property belonging to i!.") (internal quotation omitted); Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S. , 230 F .  
328, 3 3 6  (8th Cir. 19 15) ("The public lands o f  the United States are held by it, not a s  an 
ordinary individual proprietor, but in trust for all the people of all the states to pay debts and 
provide for the common defense and general welfare under the express terms of the Constitution 
itself . . . .  The Congress has the exclusive right to control and dispose of them, and no state 
can interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise."). 
285 See U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co. , 236 U.S. 459, 474 ( 1 9 1 5) ("For it must be borne 'in mind 
that Congress not only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the 
powers of the proprietor therein. Congress 'may deal with such lands precisely as a private 
individual may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from sale' . . . .  
Like any other owner it may provide when, how and to whom its land can be sold. It can permit 
it to be withdrawn from sale.") (quoting Camfield v. U.s. , 1 67 U.S. 5 1 8, 524 ( 1 897» . 
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the "public domain" in land is subject to government ownership and 
control. 286 
This is very different from the nature of ownership in the "public 
domain" in intellectual property. As discussed above, the defining 
characteristic of the public domain in intellectual property287 is that any 
individual is free to use the material as he or she sees fit;288 and once 
matter enters the public domain, the government cannot alienate that 
"property" by removing it from the public domain.289 These characteristics 
imply that the general public has an affmnative right of ownership in 
material in the public domain.290 Thus, one dictionary defines the "public 
domain" as "the realm embracing property rights belonging to the 
community at large, subject to appropriation by anyone."291 
The difference between government ownership of the public domain in 
land and common ownership of the public domain in intellectual property is 
explained by differences in the nature of the "property" involved. Real 
property is a [mite resource that is subject to the "Tragedy of the 
Commons," in which common ownership leads to an inefficient allocation of 
resources.292 Hence, government control, and a policy of privatization, 
serves the goal of economic efficiency.293 Intellectual property, by contrast, 
is a "public good" which can be used by any number of persons without 
depriving anyone else of its use.294 As Carol Rose has demonstrated, the law 
recognizes th�t certain types of "inherently public property" are best 
managed as a commons, owned by the unorganized public at large, rather 
286 Cf Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 44, at 385 ("A distinction has been made between 
'property' and 'domain. '  The former is said to be that quality which is conceived to be in the 
thing itself, considered as belonging to such or such person, exclusively of all others. By the 
latter is understood that right which the owner has of disposing of the thing. "). 
287 I am using the term "public domain" here as a synonym for the former labels of public 
property, common property, and publici juris. 
288 See supra nn. 1 30-1 3 1 , 1 39- 146, 208, 258 and accompanying text; Krasilovsky, supra 
n. 1 ,  at 206 ("Whether a work is in the public domain by reason of expiration, abandonment, or 
non-copyrightability, the effect is the same; it may be made or sold by whoever chooses to do 
so, and the right to share in its good will is possessed by all."). 
289 See supra nn. 1 32- 133  and accompanying text. 
290 See Pollack, supra n. 4, at 298 ("In a Lockian owned public domain, each member of 
the rights-bearing community (i.e., all persons in the United States) have an inalienable right not 
to be excluded."}. 
291 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra n. 1 84, at 1 836; Cf Basic 
American, Inc. v. Shatila , 992 P.2d 1 75 ,  1 92 (Idaho 1 992). 
292 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1 243 ( 1 968). 
293 See Richard Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. 4 1 1 , 42 1 ( 1 987). 
294 See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a 
Connected World 2 1 -22 (Random House 200 1 ). 
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than by a governmental entity. 295 Recall that 19th-Centuty intellectual 
property cases expressly analogized "cornmon property" in the public 
domain to such natural resources as air and water;296 these are precisely the 
types of resources which 1 9th-Century real property cases suggested were 
incapable of private ownership and which were owned by the ''unorganized 
public" at large.297 Indeed, in some instances the "public trust" in such 
resources was considered so important that courts imposed restrictions on 
the ability of the government to alienate the resource.298 Indeed, a number of 
authors have expressly drawn an analogy between the public domain in 
intellectual property law and the public trust doctrine in environmental law.299 
A number of recent cases reflect the view that the public domain is 
owned by everyone, rather than by no one. Some do so by using the phrases 
"public property,,300 or "common property.,,301 For example, in explaining the 
idea/expression dichotomy, the Second Circuit said: 
295 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7 1 1 , 720-2 1 ( 1 986) (summarizing argument); id. at 730-49 
(explaining three doctrines by which ownership by the "unorganized" public was recognized). 
296 See supra nn. 1 40, 1 44- 145,  1 52- 153  and accompanying text. 
297 See e.g. supra n. 1 53 and accompanying text; Rose, supra n. 295, at 7 1 7 - 1 8  (oceans 
and air); id. at 727-30 (tidal and submerged lands and navigable waterways). ' 
298 Rose, supra n. 295, at 736-39; see Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill. ,  1 46 U.S. 387 ( 1 892) 
(holding that state's grant of entire waterfront of Lake Michigan to private owner was void and 
could be revoked without compensation); Epstein, supra n. 293,  at 422-28 (discussing Ill. 
Central and suggesting a Constitutional basis for the decision). This distinction also helps explain 
why the Property Clause has been construed to give Congress plenary authority while the 
Intellectual Property Clause (as the Patent and Copyright Clause is sometimes known) has been 
. held to impose numerous substantive limitations on the power of Congress. See supra nn. 206-
2 1 7, 247-259 and accompanying text. 
299 See e.g. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain 26 <http://www.law.duke.edu/pdipapers/boyle.pdf> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003); 
Memo. in Support of PI. Mot. for Judm. on the Pldgs. at 52-62, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 
769 (available on Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Eldred v. Reno SJ Memo 
<http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ eldredvashcroft/cyberlsLmemo.pdf> (accessed Mar. 3, 
2003» ; see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright 
in a Digital World, 79 Or. L. Rev. 647 (2000); Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of 
Self-Help, 1 3  Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089, 1 1 1 7  n. 99 ( 1 998). 300 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152 ("It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent 
the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by 
the patent becomes public property.") (quoting Singer, 163 U.S.  at 1 85); Graham , 383 U.S. at 
3 1  n. 1 7  ("While the sealing feature was not specifically claimed in the Livingstone patent, it 
was disclosed in the drawings and specifications. Under long-settled law the feature became public 
property.") (quoting Miller v. Brass Co. ,  104 U.S.  at 352); Am. Sci. & Engr. , Inc. v. U.S., 8 CI. 
Ct. 1 29, 143 (1 985) ("[A]ny invention, when it is disclosed to the public without protection of 
an issued patent, becomes public property."). 
30 1 See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1 289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1 985) ("General plot ideas are 
not protected by copyright law; they remain forever the common property of artistic 
mankind."); Metcalfv. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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[T]he protection afforded the copyright holder has never extended 
to history, be . it documented fact or explanatory hypothesis. The 
rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of knowledge is best 
served when history is the common property of all, and each 
generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of 
the past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts 
is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the author's original 
expression of particular facts and theories already in the public 
domain. 302 
261 
Other opinions expressly address the issue of ownership. In Mayer v. 
Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd. /03 the court said: 
In this case, the fact that Mayer permitted her design to enter the 
public domain is fatal to any claim she can assert. Any theory of 
liability she could advance would necessarily assume she holds 
some property interest in the snowflake design. Yet it is elementary 
that once copyrightable material is published without the author's 
first securing federal copyright protection, the author loses his 
property interest in the material. The material becomes public 
property. In this case, Mayer no longer owned her design. The 
public did 304 
And in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema ,305 the court 
held that the heirs of the Three Stooges could not claim a trademark right in 
a fihn clip in the public domain. The court said: "any copyright has long 
expired and the film at issue is in the public domain. We all own it now.,,306 
One may legitimately ask: Why does it matter if the public oWns a 
"property" interest in the public domain? One answer lies in the rhetorical 
power of the word "property." The protection of property is one of the most 
fundamental principles of American law.307 If the public has a property 
interest in the public domain, then the entire public, not just a patent or 
copyright owner, has an interest in preserving the work and disseminating it 
for future generations. A property interest gives each member of the public 
302 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 6 1 8  F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1 980); see also 
Miller, 650 F.2d at 1 372 (same). 
303 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
304 Id. at 1 536 (citations omitted). 
305 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000). 
306 Id. at 595.  
307 See e.g. Pollack, supra n. 4, at  267-68 (discussing importance of property to the 
Framers). 
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an equal right to adapt and transfonn the material in question,308 thus 
promoting creativity. Most importantly, if the public has a property interest in 
the public domain, any deprivation of that property would be subject to the 
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 309 Such an interest may forni 
the basis for challenging Congressional action that reduces the public 
domain, such as copyright restoration.3 l O  
B. Is the Public Domain Irrevocable? 
In detennining whether the public domain is irrevocable, we must first 
remember that, historically speaking, the public domain is the default status 
of any publicly disclosed idea or work. 3 1 1 In Wheaton v. Peters,312 the 
Supreme Court made it clear that by using the word "secure," the Framers 
did not mean to imply that patents and copyrights were natural pre-existing 
rights of the inventor or author: 
[T]he word secure, as used in the constitution, could not mean the 
protection of an acknowledged legal right. It refers to inventors, as 
well as authors, and it has never been pretended, by any one, either 
in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, 
at common law, to sell the thing invented.313 
At the same time, an inventor or author was considered to have a 
property interest in an invention or work before it was disclosed to the 
308 Id. at 280 ("[E]ach member of the commonality has a claim right to be included in the 
common-a right not to be excluded. This is the ownership right that I claim for all in the public 
domain."). 
309 U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . .  "); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . "). See Epstein, supra n. 
293,  at 426-28 (suggesting a Constitutional basis for limiting the goverrunent's uncompensated 
disposition of property from common ownership to private ownership); McCarthy on 
Trademarks, supra n. l 0, at § 1 :30 ("The right to copy may be a right reserved to the people by 
the Tenth Amendment."). 
3 10 See supra n. 103- 1 14 and accompanying text. 
3 1 1 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 1 : 2  (defining "the principle of free 
copying-meaning that anyone's business ideas, inventions, writings and symbols, once disclosed 
to the public, are in the public domain and may be freely copied . . . .  Public domain is the rule; 
intellectual property is the exception."). This historical default status has been turned on its head 
by the 1 976 Copyright Act, under which a copyright arises automatically upon the fixation of a 
copyrightable work. 1 7  U.S.C. § 102(a). 
312 33 U.S. 591 ( 1 834). 
3 13 Id. at 66 1 (emphasis omitted). 
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 263 2002-2003
2003] THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 263 
pUblic. Inventions are subject to trade secret law/14 and authors were 
deemed to have a limited common-law copyright: 
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, 
and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or 
by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its 
publication, cannot be doubted ; but this is a very different right 
from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the 
future publication of the work, after the author shall have published 
it to the world. 3 15 
Hence, the grant of a patent or copyright has traditionally been 
characterized as a statutory bargain: the public agrees to give the inventor or 
author an exclusive right for a limited period of time, in exchange for the 
patent or copyright holder making the work available to the public by 
disclosure or publication.3 16 At the end of the limited period, the invention or 
work enters the public domain,3 1 7  just as it would have done if it had been 
publicly disclosed without protection. 
As shown above, a number of early opinions expressed the view that 
once the subject matte r of a patent or copyright had become "public 
property," it could not be removed from the public domain.3 18 This principle 
has been reiterated in a number of more recent cases, most notably in 
Graham v. John Deere Co. ,3 19 in which the u.s. Supreme Court stated 
that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are 
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
3 14 See U.s. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.  1 78, 186  ( 1 933) ("[The inventor] may 
keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely."); Kewanee Oil, 4 1 6  U.S. at 484 
("[T]he policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not 
incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not 
been placed in the public domain."). 
3 15 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657. 
3 16 See e.g. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.  at 150-5 1 ("The federal patent system thus embodies a 
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and 
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the 
invention for a period of years."); Sony 464 U.S. at 429 ("It is said that reward to the author or 
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.") (quoting U. S. 
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 1 3 1 ,  158  ( 1 948»; Dubilier, 289 U.S.  at 1 86 ("In consideration 
o(its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted."). 
317  Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (The purpose of patent and copyright is "to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. "); 
Dubilier, 289 U.S.  at 1 86-87 ("An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, 
but upon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, 
who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use. "). 
3 18 See supra nn. 1 32- 133  and accompanying text. 
3 19 383 U.S. 1 
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access to materials already available."320 Similar statements are found in 
cases concerning copyrights32 1 and trade secrets.322 
Trademark law presents a challenge to this basic principle. As one court 
explained, trademark law operates in the opposite direction from patent and 
copyright law: 
In the case of a copyright, an individual creates a unique design and, 
because the Constitutional fathers saw fit to encourage creativity, 
he can secure a copyright for his creation for a [limited] period . . . .  
After the expiration of the copyright, his creation becomes part of 
the public domain. In the case of a trademark, however, the process 
is reversed. An individual selects a word or design that might 
otherwise be in the public domain to represent his business or 
product. If that word or design comes to symbolize his product or 
business in the public mind, the individual acquires a property right in 
the mark. The acquisition of such a right through use represents the 
320 Id. at 6 ;  see Aronson, 440 U.S.  at 262 (1 979) ("[T]he stringent requirements for patent 
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the 
public."); Dielectric Laboratories, Inc., v. Am. Technical Ceramics, 545 F. Supp. 292, 296 
(E.D.N.Y. 1 982) (relying on "basic tenets of patent law that common knowledge should not be 
removed from the public domain"). 
321 See e.g. Mayhew v. Allsup, 1 66 F.3d 82 1 ,  822 (6th Cir. 1999) ("If a work was published 
without a valid copyright notice, however, the work irretrievably entered the public domain."); 
Dolman v. Agee, 157 F .3d 708, 7 1 3  (9th Cir. 1 998) ("If the owner failed to satisfy the [ 1909] 
Act's requirements, the work was injected irrevocably into the public domain."); Twin Books 
Corp. v. Walt Disney Co. ,  83 F.3d 1 1 62, 1 166 (9th Cir. 1 996) ("[A] publication of a work in the 
United States without the statutory notice of copyright fell into the public domain, precluding 
forever any subsequent copyright protection of the published work."); Bridge Publications, Inc. 
v. F.A.C. T.Net, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 254, 262 (D. Colo. 1998) ("Once a work enters the public 
domain, it remains there irrevocably."); Inti. Film Exch., Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 62 1 F. 
Supp. 63 1 ,  635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he Film irrevocably entered the public domain upon the 
expiration of the initial term of copyright."); Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. , 
546 F. Supp. 1 1 3, 1 16 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("When a work has been injected into the public 
domain, all of its copyright protection is lost permanently."). 
322 E.g. Smith v. Dravo Corp. , 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1 953) ("[K]nowledge cannot be 
placed in the public domain and still be retained as a 'secret' . . . .  That which has become public 
property cannot be recalled to privacy."); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. 
Servs., Inc., 923 F. SUpp. 123 1 , 1 256 (N.D. Cal. 1 995) ("Although a work posted to an Internet 
news group remains accessible to the public for only a limited amount of time, once that trade 
secret has been released into the public domain there is no retrieving it."); Milgrim, supra n. 1 2, 
at § 1 .03 (however secrecy is lost, "the principle remains: a secret on the wing cannot be 
recalled."); cf Kewanee Oil, 4 1 6  U.S.  at 484 ("[T]he policy that matter once in the public 
domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade secret 
protection. By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public domain."). 
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passage of a word or design out of the public domain into the 
protective ambits of trildemark law.323 
265 
This vision of trademark law resembles John Locke's theory of creation 
of private property from common property through the application of one's 
own labor.324 Of course, the creation of such property is subject to Locke's 
famous proviso that "enough and as good" be left for others.325 In order to 
ensure that the public domain is not depleted, trademark law contains a 
number of limiting doctrines. First, trademark law has never been thought to 
confer a property right "in gross," but only a right to use a particular mark to 
identify the source of particular goods and services.326 Second, trademark 
law traditionally protects the mark owner only against uses that cause 
consumer confusion;327 others remain free to use the mark in non-confusing 
ways.328 (Trademark dilution law threatens to upset this balance by granting 
protection without a showing of likelihood of confusion;329 and for that 
reason, certain applications of dilution law may raise serious constitutional 
questions.330) Third, trademark protection cannot be granted to the functional 
323 Boston Prof Hockey Assn. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem M/g., 5 1 0 F.2d 1004, 1 0 1 4  (5th 
Cir. 1 975). 
324 See Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law o/Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1 533,  1 544-49 ( 1 993). 
325 Id. at 1 562. 
�6 . See 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 127 (2002) (defining "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or 
device" used "to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . .  from those manufactured and sold 
by others and to indicate the source of the goods"); see id. (definition of "service mark"); 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. , 5 14 U.S. 1 59, 1 64 ( 1 995) ("It is the source-distinguishing 
ability of a mark . . .  that permits it to serve these basic purposes."). 
327 Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc. , 1 2  F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1 993) ("Compared to patent 
protection, trademark protection is relatively weak because it precludes competitors only from 
using marks that are likely to confuse or deceive the public."); W T.  Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 
F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1 985) ("The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, it is 
true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary meaning [i.e., source identification] 
and likelihood of confusion. "). 
328 See e.g. Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc. , 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that title 
. and lyrics of song "Barbie Girl" did not infringe Mattei ' s  "Barbie" trademark); New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publg. , Inc. ,  9 7 1  F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1 992) (holding that use of mark to refer 
to trademark owner was a nominative fair use); 15 U.S.C. § 1 1 1 5(b)(4) (holding that use of mark 
in good faith only to describe defendant's goods is a fair use). 
329 See generally Welkowitz, supra n. 1 2, at 59-64. 
330 Id. at 349-52 (Patent and Copyright Clause); id. at 32 8-34 (First Amendment); see e.g. 
J.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co. , 163 F.3d 27, 35 ( 1 st Cir. 1 998) ("Kohler's constitutional 
claim [is] that dilution protection of trade dress of product design amounts to an 
unconstitutional perpetual monopoly under the Patent Clause of the Constitution."); id. at 52-
53 (Boudin, J., concurring); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. , 8 1 1  F.2d 26, 34 ( 1 st Cir. 
1 987) (trademark parody protected by First Amendment). For a discussion of trademark 
parodies generally, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch 
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. Copy. Socy. 546, 620-33 ( 1 998). 
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features of a product.331 A particular application of the latter principle is the 
axiom that a mark that becomes the generic word for a product cannot be 
protected as a trademark. 332 Like a patent or copyright, the entrance of a 
generic word into the public domain is, as a general matter, irrevocable.333 
Only where a generic word, which was originally a trademark, loses its 
generic meaning may it be recaptured from the public domain. 334 
These limiting doctrines serve to prevent the metaphorical over-fishing 
of the public domain.335 Thus, while it is correct to say that trademark law 
represents an exception to the principle that matter in the public domain 
must forever remain in the public domain, it may be more accurate to say 
that trademark law removes only certain uses of a symbol from the public 
domain, leaving other uses available for the public. 
VII . CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to trace the evolution of the "public domain" 
in intellectual property law. While the public domain has existed from time 
immemorial, and has been legally recognized for nearly four hundred years, 
the phrase "public domain," which previously had been applied only to public 
lands, was imported into U.S. intellectual property law only about 100 years 
33 1 Qualitex, 5 1 4 U.S. at 1 64 ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law . . .  
from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product 
feature."); Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Little/use, Inc., 1 77 F.3d 1204, 1 2 1 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 999) 
("The functionality doctrine serves the extremely important function of avoiding conflict 
between the trademark law and the patent law. It does this by denying a perpetual exclusive right 
in a wholly functional product feature or configuration under the trademark law, where such a 
grant under the Patent Act would be unconstitutionaL"). 
332 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 12:2 ("Generic names are regarded by 
the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain."). 
333 See e.g. Henri 's Food Prods. Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 8 1 7  F.2d 1 303 , 1 305 (7th Cir. 
1987) ("On the other hand, a generic name-the common name of a class of things or a 
'common descriptive name'-is irretrievably in he public domain, and the preservation of 
competition precludes its protection."); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. A laddin Indus. , Inc., 3 2 1  
F.2d 577, 579 (2nd Cir. 1 963) ("the fact i s  that the word 'thermos' had entered the public 
domain beyond recalL"); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. , 272 F. 505, 5 1 2  (S.D.N.Y. 1921)  (L. 
Hand, J.) ("[I]t was too late in the autumn of 1 9 1 5  to reclaim the word ['aspirin'] which had 
already passed into the public domain."). 
334 McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 1 2:30 ("Only in the extraordinarily rare 
case of a designation that began life as a mark and later became a generic name could a generic 
name be resurrected back into existence as a trademark and be 'reclaimed' from the public 
domain by a change in consumer usage over a long period of time."). See supra nn. 163,  169 
("Singer" for sewing machines). 
335 See Am. Online, Inc. v. A T& T  Corp. ,  243 F.3d 8 1 2, 821 (4th Cir. 200 1) (trademark law 
"protects for public use those commonly used words and phrases that the public has adopted, 
denying to any one competitor a right to comer those words and phrases by expropriating them 
from the public 'linguistic commons. "'). 
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ago. To the extent that this phrase evokes the law, which applies to public 
lands, it mischaracterizes the public domain in intellectual property, which 
was conceived of as common property, owned by the public at large, which 
could not be alienated by the Government, except under the carefully limited 
provisions of the Patent and Copyright Clause. It is hoped that this vision of 
the public domain will assist Congress, courts and consumers in 
safeguarding the public interest in the public domain from those who seek to 
convert the intellectual commons into private property. 
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